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PERSONALIZING DEFAULT RULES AND DISCLOSURE WITH
BIG DATA
Ariel Porat* & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz**
Abstract:
This paper provides the first comprehensive account of personalized default
rules and personalized disclosure in the law. Under a personalized approach to
default rules, individuals are assigned default terms in contracts or wills that are
tailored to their own personalities, characteristics, and past behaviors. Similarly,
disclosures by firms or the state can be tailored so that only information likely to
be relevant to an individual is disclosed, and information likely to be irrelevant to
her is omitted. The paper explains how the rise of Big Data makes the effective
personalization of default rules and disclosure far easier than it would have been
during earlier eras. The paper then shows how personalization might improve
existing approaches to the law of consumer contracts, medical malpractice,
inheritance, landlord-tenant relations, and labor law.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows how
data mining can be used to identify particular personality traits in individuals, and
these traits may in turn predict preferences for particular packages of legal rights.
Second, it proposes a regime whereby a subset of the population (“guinea pigs”) is
given a lot of information about various contractual terms and plenty of time to
evaluate their desirability, with the choices of particular guinea pigs becoming the
default choices for those members of the general public who have similar
personalities, demographic characteristics, and patterns of observed behavior.
Third, we assess a lengthy list of drawbacks to the personalization of default rules
and disclosure, including cross-subsidization, strategic behavior, uncertainty,
stereotyping, privacy, and institutional competence concerns. Finally, we explain
that the most trenchant critiques of the disclosure strategy for addressing social ills
are really criticisms of impersonal disclosure. Personalized disclosure not only
offers the potential to cure the ills associated with impersonal disclosure strategies,
but it can also ameliorate many of the problems associated with the use of
personalized default rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Law is impersonal. The state generally does not tailor the contents of
the law to people’s characteristics and traits. In this Article we argue that in
the era of Big Data, law should become more personalized. Our main
focuses are default rules (situations where people face a choice between
sticking with a default option or specifying a different option instead) and
disclosure (where the law mandates that individuals receive particular
information). Our claim has important applications to contract law,
consumer law, inheritance law, medical malpractice, property law, labor
law, privacy law, and other fields.
Let us illustrate our approach with an example from inheritance law.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2217064

PERSONALIZING DEFAULT RULES AND DISCLOSURE

3

Empirical research has shown that married fathers are more likely than
married mothers to bequeath all their property to their spouse (55 percent
compared to 34 percent).1 Moreover, according to those studies men
bequeath significantly larger shares of their estates to their spouses (80
percent of estates are willed to widows versus 40 percent to widowers).
This data is consistent with rational choice models of behavior: Wives trust
their husbands less than husbands trust their wives to use inherited
resources in the best interests of their mutual children, since men are
significantly more likely to remarry and devote resources to the children
from their second marriage, at the expense of children from their first
marriage.2
If men’s testamentary preferences differ systematically from
women’s, why should intestacy laws continue to be gender-neutral?3 Why
not have different default intestacy rules for men and women instead? We
argue that as long as these preferences remain stable and gender-correlated,
a different set of rules for women would lead in the long run to more estate
resources being allocated to heirs according to decedents’ true preferences.
We further posit that it may be desirable to use other readily observable
characteristics (e.g., wealth, health, time of marriage, age of children, and
occupation) that could predict default rules in intestacy for population
subgroups. As with any default rules, individuals would be free to alter
these defaults by executing a will.
We also advocate a more ambitious version of personalization here,
one that would let courts determine how an intestate’s estate should be
allocated based on analysis of his consumer behavior during his lifetime. In
an era of Big Data, we suggest that it will be possible to find individuals
whose observable behavior and characteristics closely match those of the
intestate – we refer to these people as “guinea pigs” – to examine the kinds
of choices that the guinea pigs made in their wills, and then to use these
choices as a template for determining what the intestate likely would have
wanted.4 An upshot of widely employing this approach is that more estates
would be allocated in a way that better approximates the true preferences of
1

Debra S. Judge & Sarah Blaffer Hardy, Allocation of Accumulated Resources Among Kin:
Inheritance in Sacramento, California, 1890–1984, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 495
(1992); Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for
Legal Thought, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 322, 334 (2010).
2

Debra S. Judge, American Legacies and the Variable Life Histories of Women and Men, 6
HUMAN NATURE 291 (1995).

3

We will simplify the analysis by assuming that the decisions of people of a particular
gender who have wills and people of the same gender who die intestate have similar
preferences – but this is an assumption that ought to be tested empirically. See generally
Hacker, supra note 1, at 329 (noting that intestates die at a younger age than testators on
average); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1073 (2004) (noting that intestates are poorer than
individuals who die with a will, and that this factor may engender selection effects).

4

For much more on guinea pigs, see infra Section II.C.
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the decedent. Given the fact that most individuals leave no wills, that could
be a significant advantage. Furthermore, with detailed intestate defaults,
many individuals who would have otherwise needed to incur the expenses
of drafting wills now may no longer need to do so. After all they will
recognize that even in the absence of a written will their intestacy rules will
be personalized, more closely approximating what they would have wanted
than the status quo’s one-size-fits-all approach.
We are not the first to raise the possibility of using personalized
default rules. Recently, Cass Sunstein offered a provocative assessment of
existing, impersonal default rules and two alternatives to them: active
choices and personalized default rules.5 Sunstein’s work continues a
conversation begun by Ian Ayres, who first argued that default rules could
be “tailored” to market conditions or the attributes of parties,6 and
continued by George Geis, who modeled tailored and untailored default
rules under particular sets of assumptions to analyze the welfare
implications of trading off precision against complexity.7
Sunstein’s bottom line is that “personalized default rules are the wave
of the future; we should expect to see a significant increase in
personalization as greater information becomes available about the
informed choices of diverse people.”8 We agree wholeheartedly, and regard
his contribution to the literature as significant. He astutely notes that the
appeal of personalized default rules depends on the heterogeneity among a
given population, the state’s access to information about individuals’
preferences and ability to create a structure conducive to rational choices,
the richness of the data available about individual preferences, and the
transaction and confusion costs associated with prompting parties to a
transaction to make active choices about the parameters of a deal.9 He
inventively envisions personalized default rules in contexts like the choice
of retirement plans, cell phone plans, mortgages, and other settings.10 That
5

Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default
Rules: A Triptych, Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2012-17 (2012). Under
a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options – the
contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.

6

Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Majoritarian v. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1593, 1596-1606 (1999)
(identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity, and showing how they might
affect the law’s choice among defaults preferred by the majority or those preferred only by a
minority of contracting parties).
7
George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80
TULANE L. REV. 1109 (2006) (examining the trade-off between simple and complex default
rules).
8

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 25.

9

Id. at 3-4.

10

Id. at 24.
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said, Sunstein’s discussion of personalized default rules is truncated – it is a
short part of a short essay. He has not addressed the question of how
personalized default rules would be applied by courts. And the earlier work
by Ayres and Geis explicitly lumps together default rules that are tailored
based on both contracting parties’ characteristics and market conditions,
focusing – in the abstract – on the costs of promulgating and adjudicating
tailored default rules.11
No scholars have previously offered a comprehensive theory of
personalized default rules, nor has anyone explored the feasibility of such
an approach in detail. In this Article we will develop such a theory, show
its feasibility in the real world, and point out what legislatures and courts
should do in order to make a personalized default rule regime
implementable in many fields. In particular, we will show that with a bit of
innovative tweaking, tools developed in the age of Big Data can facilitate
the creation of certainty surrounding the meaning of default terms to
heterogeneous individuals and firms. By mitigating so much of the
uncertainty associated with the development of personalized default rules,
Big Data can make personalization far more appealing than it was in
previous information environments.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the existing thinking
on default rules, identifying the dominant strategies for supplying default
rules: majoritarian default rules, and minoritarian (penalty) default rules. It
then shows how each of these two types of default rules might be improved
via personalization, such that the contents of the rules in question will
differ among heterogeneous individuals. In this Part we illustrate our
claims mostly through consumer contracts and point out the main
considerations which could make personalized default rules approach a
viable option.
Part II examines the feasibility of personalizing default rules. It
observes that crude default rules – which use one readily observable
characteristic, such as gender or age, to sort individuals into appropriate
default rules – are already feasible, but they are also imprecise and can be
morally problematic. We show that granular default rules, which sort
individuals into several or many different default terms based on the
interactions of multiple factors, are becoming increasingly feasible in the
era of Big Data. Part II examines some of the potential gains from using
both crude and granular default rules, in inheritance law, consumer law, the
law of medical malpractice, real property law, and potentially even labor
law. A key innovation in Part II is our proposed use of “guinea pigs” to
personalize defaults. Under such an approach a small portion of the
population is given a great deal of information and time to make decisions,
and then the remaining members of the population are assigned the default
11
See Geis, supra note 7, at 1124-29 (discussing the expected costs of having tailored
default rules); Ayres, supra note 6 (analogizing the tailored vs. untailored default rule
dilemma, with the rules vs. standards debate).
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terms chosen by the guinea pigs whose observed behavior and
characteristics most closely match their own.
Part III considers a number of important objections to our proposal for
personalizing default rules. These serious objections include concerns
about unfair cross-subsidies, strategic behavior by consumers, uncertainty
and the fragmentation of case law interpreting contractual language, using
statistics and creating stereotypes, the constitutional implications of a legal
regime that provides different default rules to people based on immutable
characteristics, the privacy tradeoffs associated with the collection and use
of information about individuals, and the flexibility of personalized default
rules to deal with people whose personalities, values, and behavior change
over time. In some cases, these objections have significant force and
caution against a full-throated embrace of personalized default rules. In
other instances, we show how personalized default rules can be structured
so as to mitigate potential downsides.
Part IV shows how the same arguments for personalized default rules
also buttress the case for personalized disclosure to consumers and citizens.
Our present regime uses distinctly twentieth-century technologies to
disclose risks, side effects, and tradeoffs to consumers and citizens. In the
modern era, there is little reason to rely on these antiquated, impersonal
forms of disclosure. We instead propose a regime of “personalized
disclosure” whereby data about individual preferences, characteristics, and
predilections will be employed to improve the signal-to-noise ratio of
disclosures concerning products and services. Under such a regime
pregnant women would be shown prominent warnings likely to be of
greatest interest to them, and septuagenarian men would see only the
warnings likely to be of greatest interest to those similarly situated. This is
how a family physician or a small-town pharmacist’s disclosure to a wellknown patient has long proceeded. But it is not the way that disclosure
works for consumer products or medical services generally. Our insight is
that the powerful existing critiques of disclosure remedies are not critiques
of disclosure as such, but rather critiques of impersonal disclosure.
Personalized disclosure is becoming increasingly achievable in the modern
era, and we provide some initial thoughts on how it might be accomplished.
Indeed, we believe more broadly that personalized disclosures and
personalized default rules – and even personalized law in general – will
become essential tools in legal regulators’ quivers in the coming decades.
We even posit that personalized disclosure can ameliorate some of the
complexity problems association with a shift toward personalized default
rules. The ills of personalization, it turns out, may be countered by even
more personalization.

I. THEORIES OF PERSONALIZED DEFAULT RULES
Default rules regulate much of our lives. Any transaction in which
consumers, merchants, employees, employers, tenants or landlords engage
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will be governed by default rules. Unsurprisingly, some commentators have
suggested that one of the main goals of contract law is to reduce transaction
costs by providing contracting parties with default rules, which apply to
their transactions unless they explicitly or implicitly reject them.12
Default rules also regulate what happens after people die. When
people die intestate (without a will) default rules, prescribed by inheritance
law, allocate the estate among the heirs in a certain manner.13 An individual
may opt out of the default intestacy rules by leaving a will that allocates the
estate differently among the heirs, but as long as she does not do so, the
default rules prevail. Since many people die intestate, the content of the
default rules is of the utmost importance. Here, the default rules are
particularly “sticky”14 because biases and cognitive constraints prevent
people from contemplating their future death and the transaction costs
associated with creating a will can be high.
Under the most influential default rule theory, which we discuss in
detail below,15 default rules are aimed at decreasing transaction costs. In
order for default rules to achieve this goal, they generally should track most
people’s preferences and desires. If default rules do not satisfy this
condition, they would increase, rather than decrease, transaction costs since
most parties would opt out, and opting out is costly. Furthermore,
sometimes the parties would not opt out of undesirable default rules,
because opting out is too costly, and they will be governed by rules they
would have never chosen in the absence of transaction costs. Finally,
sometimes transaction costs prevent deals from being struck where a
meeting of the minds would have occurred in the absence of such
transaction costs; thus, reducing transaction costs by providing the parties
with default rules they prefer sometimes facilitates deals.
The legal literature has long recognized that default rules should be
tailored to specific types of transactions, until the point at which finer
tailoring is not cost justified, namely, when additional tailoring will
increase rather than decrease transaction costs.16 Although default rules are
12

See, e.g. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 341 (6th ed. 2012)
(“Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs”); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 302 notes. 13,14 (2004) (arguing that courts
should complete gaps in contracts using rules that are most likely to be desired by the parties
in order to reduce writing costs).
13

See Conn. Gen. Stat. §45a-437 (2012) (determining intestate succession in the state of
Connecticut); Cal Prob. Off. Div. 6, Pt. 2 (determining intestate succession in the state of
California); 18-A M.R.S. § 2-101 (2012) (determining intestate succession in the state of
Maine).

14

See Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLORIDA
STATE L. REV. 651 (2006) (using the term "sticky" to define default rules in settings where
the default rule is rarely changed, due to high transaction costs or for other reasons such as
fear of unknown contract provisions).
15

Infra Section A.1.

16

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
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everywhere, their prominent role in contracting is best understood. The
next sections focus on the personalization of contract default rules, while in
subsequent parts of the Article we apply our insights to other default rules
as well.

A. Contract Law Default Rules
If contracting parties were required to agree upon all the terms of their
contracts, negotiation would be endless, drafting costs would skyrocket,
many efficient contracts currently executed would never result in meetings
of the mind. Contract law thus provides the parties with numerous default
rules that become part of their contracts, unless implicitly or explicitly
rejected by the parties.17 For instance, under section 2-308 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), “[u]nless otherwise agreed… the place for
delivery of goods is the seller’s place of business or if none, the seller’s
residence...” The parties now do not need to agree beforehand on the place
of delivery, since as long as they do not say otherwise, delivery would take
place at the seller’s place. And section 2-314 of the U.C.C. maintains that
“[u]nless excluded or modified… a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” The U.C.C. proceeds in
clarifying in details what merchantability means.18 As a result, parties to a
sale contract need not explicitly agree that the goods sold should be
merchantable if the seller is a merchant; they also do not need to define
what merchantability means – the law does it for them.
Remedies for breach of contract can be understood as another
important source of default rules. While expectation damages are the
default rule, the parties may agree otherwise, for example, by excluding or
limiting liability for consequential losses or by incorporating a liquidated
damages clause into their contracts.19 Indeed, the parties’ power to opt out
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 117-8 (1989) (arguing that adopting tailored rules to fill
gaps in the contract, creates costs of distinguishing different types of parties and
transactions); Ayres, supra note 6 (arguing that when decision maker creates a tailored
default rule she should account for both precision and complexity).
17

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 293 (“When a court imputes terms to fill in a contract,
the implicit terms apply by default, which means ‘in the absence of explicit terms to the
contrary’”); SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 302 notes 13, 14 (arguing that when parties leave
gaps in the contract courts should fill these gaps by adopting an interpretation method that
minimizes the sum of writing costs and the costs of errors in the interpretation).
18

U.C.C., § 2-314(2) (detailing the conditions under which goods are considered
merchantable).
19

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (stating that the parties can decide
in advance the damages payable in case of breach, and that such an agreement replaces the
courts inquiry about the correct level of damages); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§12.18 (4d ed. 2004) (stating that parties can agree upon remedial rights, different than the
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of the “full compensation” default rule is limited: courts could strike down
a liquidated damages clause as a penalty20 or use the doctrine of
unconscionability to refuse to enforce exclusionary clauses in consumer
contracts, especially when they exonerate the merchant from liability for
bodily injury.21

B. Majoritarian Default Rules
1. In General
Under the majoritarian default rules theory, which is the most
accepted and influential one among law and economics theorists, a default
rule should mimic the term that the majority of the parties to whom it
applies would have agreed upon, if they had considered it as an option
when making their contract.22 Thus, if most contracting parties in a sales
contract prefer delivery of the goods to take place at the seller’s place,
section 2-308 of the U.C.C. is the appropriate default rule. The logic behind
the majoritarian default rules theory is simple: since default rules aim at
decreasing transaction costs, they should fit the transactors’ preferences as
closely as possible. There would always be parties that prefer a rule
different than the one preferred by the majority, and they would have to opt
out of the default rule, thereby incurring transaction costs. But the majority
of the transactors would not opt out, thereby saving the transaction costs
they would have incurred but for the default rule.23
A central question for the majoritarian theory is how to predict most
parties’ preferences. Do most parties to sales contracts prefer delivery of
the goods at the seller’s or the buyer’s place? Do they prefer expectation
damages or maybe just reliance damages? Law and economics scholars
contend that most contracting parties want their contracts to reduce costs
remedies usually supplied by the courts).
20

FARNSWORTH, id., id. (stating that parties’ power to bargain over remedial rights is limited
by the principle of compensation, which means that the stipulated sum cannot be
significantly larger than the amount required to compensate the injured party for its loss);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 19, id. (stating that the parties’ power to
set liquidated damages is limited, and that the liquidated damages provision must regard the
principle of compensation).
21

U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.”).
22

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 293-4 (arguing that courts should impute terms in the
contract that the parties would have agreed upon if they had negotiated the term in advance);
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1820-3 (1991) (arguing that default rules should be the most likely
result of a hypothetical bargaining between the parties).
23

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 294 (arguing that the efficient default rule is preferable
because most parties would not wish to opt-out, and that will save transaction costs).
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and increase benefits, thereby increasing the surplus of their contract,
which they can divide among themselves.24 Therefore, the majoritarian
default rule should be efficient. Thus, according to this view, if in most
cases the costs of delivery at the seller’s place of business are lower than at
the buyer’s, section 2-308 of the U.C.C. is an efficient default rule.
Similarly, if full expectation damages provide more efficient incentives to
the parties to perform and reduce expected losses compared to reliance
damages, an expectation damages default rule is superior to a reliance
damages default rule.25 Note that one should not be efficiency-oriented to
adopt the majoritarian default rule theory; this theory is committed to one
notion only: the default rule should mimic the majority of the parties’
preferences, whatever these preferences are.26
Default rules can be context-sensitive, which is a nod in the direction
of personalization.27 Thus, even if a damages default rule is better than a
specific performance default rule in total since most contracting parties
would prefer the former remedy to the latter, there could be enough
situations, and enough types of contracts, where most parties would have
the opposite preference. While the more common remedy under American
contract law is damages,28 when the contract is for the sale of a unique
24

Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX L. REV.
1581,1588 (2005) (“Each party [to the contract] wants to maximize his gain from the
transaction, and that is usually done by agreeing to terms that maximize the surplus created
by the transaction - the excess of benefits over costs, the excess being divided between the
parties”); Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract,
120 YALE L. J. 690 (2011) (arguing that the remedy of rescission followed by restitution is
socially desirable, and that the parties to the contract would want it ex-ante, since it
incentivizes the parties to invest in the contract to the level that maximizes the joint surplus)
25

See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 THE BELL J. OF ECON.
466 (arguing that full expectation damages provide efficient incentive to parties to perform,
and thus fill gaps in the contract that involve unlikely future contingencies); Steven Shavell,
Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1573-4 (2009) (arguing that the promisor’s option to breach and
pay expectation damages is a default rule incorporated into an incomplete contract); COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 12, at 287-9 (arguing that expectation damages usually give better
incentives to the promisor, and therefore are superior to reliance damages).
26
See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989) (explaining how non-efficiency theories of contract law could be
the source of default rules, but arguing that efficiency is much better source); Omri BenShahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (2009)
(arguing that some default rules have distributive, rather than an efficiency, effect, and
proposing criteria for giving those default rules content).
27

See Ayres, supra note 6, at 4-6 (arguing that when decision maker creates a tailored
default rule she should find the optimal point in which the rule is specific enough but not too
complex); Geis, supra note 7 (modeling the simplicity-complexity dimension of default
rules, and suggesting that under certain assumptions a simpler, though less accurate, default
rule would better reduce transaction costs).

28

FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, at §12.8 (stating that the award of damages, measured by
the injured party's expectation, is the common form of relief for breach of contract).
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good, courts are commonly willing to grant a remedy of specific
performance.29 Instead of having one default rule as to the choice between
damages and specific performance for all contracts, there are two different
default rules: one for selling unique goods, and another for other contracts.
But the default rules could be – and indeed they are – even more
specifically tailored, and at least from an economics point of view they
should be tailored until the point where additional tailoring is not cost
justified.30 We discuss this issue below in more detail.31
2. Personalized Majoritarian Default Rules
Tailoring default rules is often done for different types of transactions,
or for different contexts (even for the same type of transaction). But as far
as we can tell, it is not done for the personal characteristics of the parties.32
Consider the following example.
Example 1. Place of Delivery. Dan is a disabled consumer, who
uses a wheelchair for mobility. He purchases a large-screen
television from an electronics store. Should the default place of
delivery be the seller’s or the buyer’s place?
Even if for most consumer contracts the efficient rule is delivery at the
seller’s place, this is not necessarily the case in Example 1. The personally
tailored default rule for wheelchair-using consumers, who can be identified
easily as such, typically would be delivery at the buyer’s place, since such
delivery would reduce the parties’ total costs, and be preferred by them.33
29
Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 355-6 (1978) (stating
that courts typically grant specific performance in contracts for the sale of a “unique” item,
such as the sale of land, antiques, patent rights, etc.); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271, 272-4 (1979) (same).
30
Ayres, supra note 6, at 7-9 (arguing that since more tailoring creates complexity and
uncertainty, the decision maker needs to tailor the rule up to the point where these costs
outweigh the reduction in transaction costs).
31

Infra Part III.C.

32

In the U.C.C there is a distinction between merchants and non-merchants (U.C.C. § 2104(1) (2005) defines a merchant), and some of the Code’s terms offer customized rules for
merchants. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (2005) (imposing higher warranty standards by default
on merchant sales). Some commentators have raised the argument for having different rules
of interpretation for sophisticated and non-sophisticated parties. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 56970 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
33
See Cari Shields, et al. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts us, Inc., et al., 279 F.R.D. 529
(U.S. Dist. 2011). In a motion for class certification, plaintiffs, all visually impaired visitors
of the Disney resorts in California, allege that defendants discriminated against them. One
of the arguments was that the audio description devices provided by the defendant are
designed to shut-off automatically after a given time, and cannot be reset by visually
impaired users. The court analyzed this argument in terms of design defect. One could argue
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Indeed, with such a default rule, a seller would probably be able to charge
the disabled buyer a premium for delivery, and needless to say the buyer
(or seller) should be able to opt out of the personalized default rule if so he
wishes. But as long as no one opts out, delivery at the buyer’s place, in
example 1, could be a better default rule than the one commonly applied to
buyers who are not disabled.34 Now consider a more complicated example.
Example 2: Specific performance or damages. Steven is a classic
rational actor. He feels no personal attachment to property and
changes his residence quite often. Sarah holds Kantian moral
values regarding keeping one’s promises, feels personal
attachment to property, rarely changes her place of residence and
when she does, she spends months searching for the perfect place.
Both Steven and Sarah entered into (separate) contracts to
purchase homes from John, who is a merchant in the business of
selling homes. John breaches both contracts by failing to deliver
possession and title, and the question of the adequate remedy
arises. Assuming everything else about the contracts is equal,
except the parties’ characteristics, should the court order the same
remedy for Steven and Sarah?
Under current law the answer is typically yes. A possible qualification
is that if John could have reasonably understood while negotiating the
contracts with Steven and Sarah, that Steven preferred a damages remedy
and Sarah preferred specific performance, the court may take that into
account in choosing the appropriate remedy. We argue that under the
assumption that the characteristics of the parties are verifiable by John and
the courts, a court ought to award damages to Steven and grant specific
performance to Sarah. Indeed, John may price the contract differently for
Steven and Sarah, or at least offer them different contractual terms, which
would balance the additional costs that specific performance entails for the
seller.
C. Minoritarian (or Penalty) Default Rules
1. In General
In a seminal article published in 1989, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
identified a second type of default rule, which they called the “Penalty

that the automatic shut-down is preferable for most users, thus making it the majoritarian
default rule, while plaintiffs are seeking to impose on defendant personalized default rule for
visually impaired visitors.
34

Business practices in American grocery stores track this default to some extent. A grocery
bagger is likely to ask an elderly customer with a large order whether she would like
assistance unloading groceries into her car, but probably will not bother asking a twentyyear old who has purchased a box of corn flakes and a magazine the same question.
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Default Rule.”35 Unlike the majoritarian default rule, the penalty default
rule is not aimed at mimicking the contractual term most parties prefer, but
instead at penalizing the party whom has private information that the other
party does not have, in order to incentivize the former to reveal that
information to the latter, thereby facilitating an efficient contract.36
An example of a penalty default rule used by Ayres and Gertner was
the foreseeability requirement, set up in Hadley v. Baxendale.37 Under this
requirement, the aggrieved party is entitled to compensation only for
foreseeable losses. Ayres and Gertner explain that without the
foreseeability limitation on liability, an aggrieved party with unforeseeable
losses would hide this information from the other party. The foreseeability
limitation penalizes an aggrieved party that hides the information by
barring recovery for his unforeseeable losses in case of a breach.38 In
particular, if the aggrieved party is not the cheapest cost avoider or the
cheapest insurer of his unforeseeable losses, he would disclose the potential
losses to the other party. This disclosure renders the losses foreseeable, and
the other party would take them into account in deciding whether to enter
into the contract, how much to invest in precautions, and whether to
perform or breach.39
Several commentators criticized Ayres and Gertner penalty default
rules theory from several angles. It was argued that a penalty default rule,
as described by Ayres and Gertner, would not necessarily force revelation
of private information by a contracting party, because the revelation might
directly contradict bargaining strategies,40 or because the party with the
private information might benefit from being pooled together with other

35

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 91 (“Penalty defaults are defaults which are designed
to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and
therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”)
36
In other occasions, a penalty default rule would penalize both parties for concealing
information that makes the determination of their dispute easier for courts; in this way Ayres
and Gertner explain the then U.C.C. § 2-201 zero quantity provision, under which, if the
parties have not agreed on the quantity, courts would not fill in the gap in it and the contract
will not be enforced. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 95-96, note 43.
37

Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).

38

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 101-4 (arguing that the decision in Hadley is an
example of a penalty default rule).
39
See Thomas Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of
Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984) (describing the various stages where the
promisor takes decisions and incentives matter); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies,
Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. (1988) 629 (same).
40
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE L. J. 616 (1991) (arguing that the Hadley default penalty rule will not
incentivize promisees to reveal private information, since the revelation of the value the
promisee ascribes to the contract to the promisor, would allow the promisor to raise the
contract price substantially).
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parties, thereby externalizing costs to them.41 Eric Posner prominently
argued that there are no penalty default rules in contract law, nor should
there be any. The reason is that both majoritarian default rules and penalty
default rules force contracting parties with private information, which
prefer to opt out of the default rule, to reveal their private information to
the other party, who would offer them a different contract in exchange.
Opting out is costly, so a majoritarian default rule would function better
than a penalty default rule, since it encourages fewer parties to opt out. It is
possible that the minority’s total costs of opting out would exceed the
majority’s total costs to opt out, but this is an unlikely scenario. 42
We might better understand a penalty default rule as a species of
minoritarian default rule, as Ayres and Gertner acknowledged in an essay
they published a decade after they first proposed the penalty default rule
idea.43 We believe that at least as personalized default rules are concerned,
there could be penalty default rules, or more accurately, minoritarian
default rules, as we explain below. We do suspect, however, that the rise of
Big Data (described in Part II) will make penalty default rules decreasingly
important, since firms are gaining access to a treasure trove of information
about individual consumers.
2. Minoritarian Default Rules as Facilitators of Personalized Default Rules
Minoritarian default rules could facilitate personalized majoritarian
default rules. Here’s how. If sellers and courts have full information about
buyers, default rules aimed at forcing buyers to reveal private information
will be meaningless. Sellers and courts, however, often do not have full
information about buyers’ preferences, characteristics, and traits, and
tailoring default rules personally for them seems to be impractical. A
default rule could provide incentives for buyers to reveal their preferences,
characteristics, and traits to sellers, either for a specific transaction or for
many future transactions, by penalizing those buyers who could convey

41
Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547
(1999) (arguing that parties with private information would not reveal their types when they
enjoy from the cross-subsidization entailed by pooling them with other parties).
42

See Eric Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLORIDA STATE
U. L. REV. 563 (2006) (arguing that examples of penalty default rules are either not default
rules at all, or can be explained by the majoritarian default rule theory); Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal
Information, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1615, 1624-6 (assessing the Hadley default rule of limited
liability, the authors argue that the rule entails some costs in different situations, and should
be adopted only in situations where the parties would have most likely wanted it in advance,
which makes it a majoritarian default rule); Johnston, supra note 40, at 622-3 (arguing that
the Hadley rule might be preferable by the parties ex-ante, and thus not a penalty rule).
43
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1600-02 (explaining that penalty default rule is one type
of minoritarian default rule, which is efficient when it is less costly for the majority than the
minority to opt out).
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such information cheaply but nevertheless failed to do so.
Consider again example 2 (Specific Performance or Damages).
Suppose sellers and courts cannot distinguish accurately between Steven
and Sarah, and therefore tailoring personalized default rules for them is
currently impossible. Nevertheless, a default rule of damages could change
the outcome. If Sarah is aware of the damages default rule, she will reveal
her preferences for specific performance to the seller, or, alternatively,
reveal her characteristics and traits to him, from which he would be able to
deduce that unless they agree otherwise, her remedy will be specific
performance. Thus, the damages default rule will penalize Sarah if she does
not convey information to the seller about her preferences or
characteristics.
Could specific performance function in the same way? Under a
specific performance default rule, Steven would arguably reveal neither his
preference for damages nor his characteristics and traits, because he is no
worse off with specific performance than with a damages remedy. Though
he is indifferent between damages and specific performance, he may be
better off with specific performance, since that latter remedy would
improve his bargaining position vis-à-vis the seller, for whom specific
performance is typically more burdensome.44
But this analysis is incomplete. If the seller is able to structure the
contract so as to reward buyers who are entitled to the less burdensome
remedy, then both damages and specific performance could function
effectively to force buyers to reveal their preferences, characteristics and
traits. Specifically, while a damages default rule would penalize Sarah ex
post if she does not reveal her preferences or characteristics, specific
performance would penalize Steven ex ante (higher price, or less favorable
contractual terms) if he does not reveal his preferences or characteristics.
The choice between damages and specific performance should therefore
hinge on the empirical question of whose costs of revealing his or her
preferences or characteristics are lower: Steven or Sarah’s? If the answer is
Steven, specific performance should be the more efficient default rule, and
if it is Sarah, damages should be the most efficient default rule. Even if
there are more “Stevens” than “Sarahs” among buyers, but it is much less
costly for “Stevens” than for “Sarahs” to reveal their preferences or
characteristics, specific performance could be the efficient (minoritarian)
default.
Under our personalized default rules theory parties do not directly
negotiate the terms of the contract, but instead reveal information about
their characteristics and traits, which in turn affect the contents of a set of
default rules applied to them. That information could often be private and
44

Schwartz, supra note 29, at 274 (arguing that if damages are fully compensatory, adding
the option of specific performance creates an opportunity for the promisee to exploit the
promisor by threatening to compel performance when costs of performance are higher than
the damages); Craswell, supra note 39, at 636-40 (same).
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even confidential: not every sensitive, neurotic buyer would like to reveal
these attributes to a seller. In other words, for some types of characteristics
and traits, the default rules could be stickier than for others, and the people
possessing the former characteristics and traits could be the minority. In the
same way, some types of parties may have significant cognitive limitations
or biases that would make it especially burdensome for them to reveal
private information about their preferences, and those parties could be the
minority. Here a minoritarian default rule could similarly work better than
a majoritarian one.
D. Third Party Effects
Under a third approach to determining the content of default rules,
default rules should maximize social welfare in general, not necessarily the
welfare of the contracting parties. Contract law often takes negative effects
on third parties as a central consideration in enforcing contracts. For
example, an entire chapter of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
is dedicated to “Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy.”45 This
chapter, however, is not about default rules, but instead about mandatory,
immutable rules: naturally, the parties are not allowed to opt out of those
rules. Contract law doctrines, however, only rarely take positive effects on
third parties into account,46 and externalizing benefit default rules are
rare.47
In some instances, the personalization of default rules may produce
benefits to third parties, or positive externalities, and the desire to promote
such externalities may convince society to embrace personalization. For
example, many jurisdictions confront the dilemma of how to encourage
people to donate their organs after death to save other people’s lives. A
possible solution is to have a default rule that is expected to be quite sticky:
most people would not opt out, whatever the default rule is.48 Assuming the
social goal is to find an optimum between fulfilling people’s wishes and
third parties’ benefits (if those benefits were the only issue, a mandatory
rule of donation would be the optimal solution,49) tailoring personalized
default rules to different groups in society could be an optimal solution.
Thus, if there are groups in society – say, adherents of Shintoism – who are
45

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178-199 (1981).

46

See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1981), according to which “[i]n
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise… a meaning that serves the public
interest is generally preferred.” See also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract
Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1723-4 (1997) (discussing
the aforementioned interpretation rule).

47

See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1598-90 (discussing default rules which create
positive externalities).
48

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1-2.

49

See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 807-08 (2005).
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expected to object to organs’ donations, and would opt out of any default
rule that allows it,50 a no-donation default rule is the desirable one for them,
since it would save transaction costs of opting out. If instead there are other
groups in society that might oppose donation weakly but would not incur
the costs of opting out, applying a default rule that is not majoritarian but
balances possible donors’ weak preferences against the strong preferences
of people on transplant waiting lists could better achieve the social goal.
Indeed, personalizing rules may dampen political opposition to the
implementation of default rules that produce positive externalities by
“buying off” the interest groups that are most likely to oppose a default rule
that benefits third parties.

II.THE FEASIBILITY OF PERSONALIZED DEFAULT RULES
Part I showed how majoritarian and penalty default rules might be
personalized. The discussion so far implicitly has contemplated two
different sorts of personalized default rules. One personalized default rule
takes a particular, observable characteristic, and sorts individuals into
different legal defaults based on whether they possess that characteristic.
For example, if the state observes that men and women have systematically
different preferences for how their estates should be divvied up among
heirs, then the law might create one set of intestacy rules for men and
another for women.51 Gender is easily observable, so the costs of
determining which set of intestacy rules apply will be low. We can refer to
similar approaches as “crude personalized default rules.”
Greater personalization is possible. Suppose that politically
conservative and politically liberal women have different preferences with
respect to the division of their estates. Suppose further that politically
conservative women from cities and rural areas systematically differ in the
way they prefer to divide their estates. In theory, there are multitudes of
possible personalized default rules. Nevertheless, regularities exist, and the
task of using those regularities to establish sufficiently large groups of likeminded individuals who can be assigned the same set of default rules
confronts a tradeoff between precision and complexity.52 We will refer to
precise default rules that employ many characteristics about individuals –
including their past behaviors in similar circumstances – to predict the
contractual or testamentary terms they would have opted for as “granular
personalized default rules.”
The feasibility of employing crude personalized default rules is a
50
See Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious
Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 45 HOU. L. REV. 1529, 1566 n. 268 (2009).
51

Assume for present purposes that such classifications are legally permissible. That
assumption may be an unreasonable one. We discuss the issue further infra Section III.D.
52

See infra Part III.C.
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straightforward matter. We need only show that a particular characteristic
accurately predicts future behavior. That said, we will show why using
crude personalized default rules is often less desirable than employing
granular personalized default rules. In this Part, we therefore will focus on
the feasibility of those granular defaults.
A. Big Data and Big Five
An apparent hurdle in creating personalized default rules is the issue
of convenient identification of relevant default rules both ex ante by the
parties, and ex post by the courts. Suppose a legal dispute has arisen
concerning ambiguity in a contract. Once the nature and the stakes of the
dispute are clear to both parties, each will have an incentive to argue that
she is the type of person who ought to be entitled to the personalized
default rule that would cause the court to rule in her favor. To take our
Example 2, both Steven and Sarah will argue that they are the types of
people entitled to specific performance if that remedy creates an
entitlement that strengthens their bargaining position relative to John.53 Is
there a reliable way to prevent these problems of proof? We believe that in
the era of Big Data the answer to that question is yes.
Big Data is commonly defined as the process whereby computers sift
through enormous quantities of data to identify patterns that can predict
individuals’ future behavior.54 It depends on the combination of gigantic
databases (typically cataloging consumer behavior) with predictive
analytics. Firms spent $28 billion on Big Data in 2012, a number that is
estimated to grow to $34 billion in 2013.55 To put that $28 billion number
in perspective, it is an amount equal to the annual Gross Domestic Product
of Jordan or Latvia.56 Yet with greater growth potential.
What are these 28 billion dollars purchasing? It is hard to know for
sure, since many uses of Big Data are being kept as proprietary trade
secrets. But in the past year, the news media has reported on applications of
Big Data to a dizzying array of industries. Facebook’s new “social graphs”
search feature seeks to employ that company’s Big Database to better
predict which search results will be most useful to individuals who type in
search queries.57 Big Data is a big industry in higher education.58 Big Data
53

See supra Part I.B.2. and text accompanying note 44.

54

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV.
___ (forthcoming 2013).
55

Nick Kolakowski, Big Data Spending Will Hit 28 Billion in 2012, Slashdot, available at
http://slashdot.org/topic/bi/big-data-spending-will-hit-28-billion-in-2012-gartner/.

56

See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp

57

Somini Sengupta & Claire Cain Miller, Search Option from Facebook is a Privacy Test,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2013, at A1.

58

Marc Perry, Big Data on Campus, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2012, at ED24.
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is a big business in medicine.59 It is all the rage in insurance.60 Researchers
have shown how by analyzing on-line behavior they can predict an
individual’s race,61 and how by monitoring an individual’s television
viewing habits, they can make accurate predictions about her ideology.62
And the campaign to reelect President Obama was lauded (and criticized)
for its sophisticated use of Big Data techniques to identify and energize the
President’s partisans.63 These technologies have been employed to help
businesses find customers who will be profitable, patients who will need
special care, voters who are persuadable, and insureds who present good
risks.64
Even brick and mortar outfits with familiar business models are using
data-driven strategies to personalize service in a way that will appeal to
their customers. For example, restaurants are increasingly assembling
dossiers on customers, so that they will remember whether particular
patrons prefer black or white napkins, and red or white wine.65 This
information can then be shared with partner restaurants via
Opentable.com’s reservation database.66 With the benefit of this data, savvy
restaurants can provide a first-time diner with the same sort of personalized
service that regulars from the neighborhood have long come to expect.
Law is perhaps the primary major industry in which the effects of Big
Data have not been widely documented, although that is beginning to
change, according to a forthcoming article by Daniel Katz.67 Katz identifies
59

Derrick Harris, Better Medicine, Brought to You by Big Data, GigaOM, July 15, 2012,
available
at
<http://gigaom.com/cloud/better-medicine-brought-to-you-by-bigdata/?utm_source=social&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gigaom>.
60

Laurie Sullivan, Credit Ratings Aid Marketers in Targeting Ads, Aug. 20, 2012, Media
Post News available at <http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/181075/creditratings-aid-marketers-in-targeting-ads.html#axzz2F2rHWmiH>.
61
Alistair Croll, Big Data is Our Generation’s Civil Rights Issue, and We Don’t Know It,
O’Reilly Radar, Aug. 2, 2012, available at <http://radar.oreilly.com/2012/08/big-data-isour-generations-civil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it.html>.
62

Bill Carter, Republicans Like Golf, Democrats Prefer Cartoons, TV Research Suggests,
N.Y.
Times
Media
Decoder,
Oct.
11,
2012,
available
at
<http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/republicans-like-golf-democratsprefer-cartoons-tv-research-suggests/?smid=tw-nytimes>.
63

Obama Campaign’s Voter Data Crunching Paid Off, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 2012.

64

Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumer Buying Power, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
2012, at BU1 (profiling eBureau, a technology company that uses data mining to determine
which individuals are likely to be profitable customers for firms).

65

Susanne Craig, Getting to Know You, N.Y. Times, Sep. 5, 2012, at D1.
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See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – or – How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62
EMORY
L.J.
__
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
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numerous applications of Big Data to the legal profession, suggesting its
utility in predicting legal costs at the outset of a case, predicting outcomes
in litigation, helping firms hire the right attorneys, and managing the
discovery process.68 Our proposal suggests a different way in which the
legal system can leverage the benefits of Big Data. Under certain
circumstances, we want the courts (and advocates in the courtroom) to
embrace the science of Big Data as a means of deciding what terms ought
to be imported into an ambiguous contract or will. Furthermore, we
propose that parties often would be able to make use of Big Data to predict
beforehand what default rules will be applied to their contracts. We later
explain in more detail how that would work, but before we do it a few more
words on Big Data and Big Five are in order.
Journalists writing about Big Data have spilled much more ink
discussing the fact of Big Data’s proliferation than what makes it
efficacious. At bottom, we believe a major reason why Big Data enables
firms and government entities to predict future behavior is that patterns of
purchases, mouse clicks, credit payments, and social network ties reveals
fundamental aspects of individuals’ personalities and values.69
Psychologists understand human behavior largely in terms of the “Big
Five”
personality
characteristics:
Extraversion,
Neuroticism,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness.70 An enormous
psychological literature has identified ways in which particular personality
traits are more pronounced among people who engage in particular sorts of
behaviors.71 For example, people who score highly on extraversion are
more likely to disclose information about themselves on social networks,72
people who score highly on conscientiousness are more likely to be

68

Id.

69

Strahilevitz, supra note 54, at __.

70

Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 1, 3-5 (1991).
71

The legal literature employing “Big Five” analysis in a sophisticated way, by contrast, is
relatively sparse. For examples of successful interdisciplinary work of this sort, see Stuart P.
Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public
Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 445
(2011); and Margaret C. Stevenson & Tracy L. Caldwell, Personality in Juror DecisionMaking: Toward an Idiographic Approach in Research, 33 L. & PSYCH. REV. 93 (2009).
Although it characterizes individuals in a way that diverges somewhat from the Big Five
framework, the Cultural Cognition Project has done the most influential legal work applying
research about personality heterogeneity to legal problems. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al.,
Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws, 34 L. &
HUMAN BEHAV. 118 (2010).
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Baiyun Chen & Justin Marcus, Students’ Self-Presentation on Facebook: An Examination
of Personality and Self-Construal Factors, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAV. 2091, 2097
(2012); Traci Ryan & Sophia Xenos, Who Uses Facebook? An Investigation into the
Relationship Between the Big Five, Shyness, Narcissism, Loneliness, and Facebook Usage,
27 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAV. 1658, 1662 (2011).
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politically conservative,73 and Americans score noticeably higher on
personality tests measuring agreeableness than do Western Europeans.74 By
employing Big Data, firms have found a substitute for administering
complex personality tests to all potential customers so that they can identify
everyone’s quirks and predilections.75 Because these firms are using
publicly available data and proprietary data that is bought and sold in the
marketplace, they can dispense with obtaining the consent of the
individuals whose behavior is being studied. Moreover, because they will
be studying a consumers’ revealed preferences, rather than her responses to
surveys (which might be slanted in ways the consumer believes will benefit
her), firms may justifiably view the results of these quasi-personality tests
as particularly reliable metrics. We are not suggesting that the Big Five
research unlocks every behavioral mystery – the extant data suggests
otherwise76 – but it surely identifies numerous powerful tendencies among
individuals and groups.
A fascinating new article by Gokul Chittaranjan, Jan Bloom, and
Daniel Gatica-Perez shows the promise and potential of using data mining
to identify individuals’ personality profiles.77 These three scholars
administered personality tests to scores of Swiss smartphone users and then
monitored the users’ smartphone activity over the next 17 months. They
found numerous significant correlations between particular personality
traits and observed smartphone behavior. If you have someone’s cell phone
and you know what to look for, you know a lot about what makes them
tick. Along the way they showed that as a practical matter it is
straightforward to analyze smartphone usage data automatically so as to
predict the personalities of individual phone users. They summarized some
of their main findings as follows:
The results clearly show that several aggregated smart-phone usage
features could be predictive of the Big-Five personality traits. . . It
was found that extraverts, who are characterized by talkativeness
and outgoing nature, were more likely to receive calls and also
spend more time on them. . . . Agreeableness among women was
associated with an increase in the number of incoming calls.
Agreeable men were found to communicate with more number of
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Dana R. Carney et al., The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality
Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind, 29 POLITICAL PSYCH. 807,
824 (2008).
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David P. Schmitt et al., The Geographic Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits, 38 J.
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCH. 173, 185 tbl. 2 (2007).
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Strahilevitz, supra note 54, at __.
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See, e.g., Stevenson & Caldwell, supra note 71, at 110-11.
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Gokul Chittaranjan et al., Mining Large-Scale Smartphone Data for Personality Studies,
15 PERSONAL UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 1 (December 2011).
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unique contacts through voice calls. On the other hand,
conscientiousness was associated with higher usage of the Mail
app, which could be used in a professional context, and with lower
usage of the YouTube application, which is likely to be used for
entertainment purposes. Conscientious users were also likely to
contact lesser number of unique people through voice calls. This
conforms with their characterization in the literature as responsible
and organized individuals. Interestingly, emotional stability was
linked to higher incoming SMS. And high openness was associated
with increased usage of Video / Audio / Music apps in women and
also with the usage of nonstandard calling profiles such as Beep
and Ascending in the entire population.
This is an extraordinarily rich set of findings, and it suggests that
Verizon, AT & T, Apple, Samsung, and other major firms in the cell phone
industry possess a treasure chest of personal information about the
character of their customers. Yet their research has been completely
ignored by legal scholars. A follow-up Big Data project, in which a team of
researchers from MIT and the University of Trento analyzed social network
ties and personalities of cell phone users, suggests that in many respects
behavioral data from smart-phones can better predict individuals’
personalities than personality surveys themselves.78 This hot-of-the-presses
research confirms that behavioral data can predict personality, and we
already know from a vast psychology literature that personality can predict
behavior. The iPhones, not the eyes, turn out to be windows into the soul.
That is why Big Data is already a $28 billion industry.
To be sure, sometimes Big Data has predictive power because it teases
out regularities that have little to do with personality. For example, Target
Corporation’s data miners identified a pattern whereby their female
customers who suddenly started purchasing multivitamins and lotion were
buying cribs and newborn diapers six months later.79 Through analytics,
Target realized that multivitamin and lotion purchases were an early
warning indicator about a biological change that was happening in pregnant
women’s bodies, which the women might otherwise be reluctant to reveal
to Target. Target used this information to its advantage, since its marketing
psychologists understood that the birth of a new child is a life-changing
event that disrupts existing purchasing patterns. If Target could make new
moms into loyal customers, there was a greater chance that they could keep
them as customers in the years and decades that followed.80
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B. Big Data in the Law
Big Data can be used to predict future behavior because the process of
studying an individual’s purchases, online searches, voting behavior,
borrowing activity, and social network composition reveals aspects of that
individual’s personality and preferences. Of course, it is one thing for firms
to employ analytics at a high level and another matter entirely to think that
lawyers or judges can duplicate the processes that were employed at a high
level by Fortune 500 companies and successful presidential reelection
campaigns. The institutional competence concerns are legitimate,
especially at the present, when courts have developed no expertise in
profiling and Big Data generally. Nevertheless, we submit that in
conjunction with social science research and an adversarial system whereby
litigants’ counsel educate judges and juries, Big Data techniques already
can generate a set of crude personalized default rules to resolve matters that
are frequently the subject of litigation. We would envision psychological
evidence coming before the court via expert testimony, so it would of
course be subject to Daubert81 and the rules that generally govern evidence
admissibility, with liberal use of in camera proceedings where proprietary
algorithms need to be evaluated. As the science advances, we believe that
skilled legal counsel and these expert witnesses can help the law shift
towards increasingly granular personalized default rules. The legally
relevant question would be the parties’ characteristics and traits at the time
the contract was entered into (or, in the case of probate matters, at the
decedent’s death), as well as past behavior of the parties involved. In our
world of Big Data and nearly infinite storage capacity, this sort of
information should be readily accessible.
Because personalized, Big Data-driven default rules can work in
litigation, they should be predictable by the parties when creating their
rights and duties, and prove useful to parties seeking to settle their disputes
in the shadow of the law. Firms are already accessing and analyzing the
profiles of individual consumers for marketing, pricing, and quality
assurance purposes anyway, and the individual consumer usually knows
her own true preferences and characteristics reasonably well. It is therefore
plausible that parties would be able to verify the content of the default rules
applied to them,82 and if there are disputes, many of them could settle
without the need for experts to be hired and summary judgment motions to
be resolved. We have already shown how Big Data and personalization
could change the law of inheritance.83 Let us now consider other important
applications.
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1. Consumer Contracts
The most natural field to apply the personalized default rules approach
is consumer law. As we have explained, firms have an increasingly
enormous amount of data on consumers’ preferences and characteristics.
This data can be used to tailor different default rules for their contracts.
This same data can be utilized by the parties to settle disputes in the
shadow of the law, as well as by the courts. Since consumers are generally
aware of their characteristics and traits, they will find the personalized
default rules more predictable than the impersonal default rules currently
applied to their contracts.
Consider Example 1 (Place of Delivery) first, which suggests that
while a default rule for consumers who are not disabled could be “delivery
at the seller’s place of business,” a “delivery at the buyer’s residence”
might be a better default rule for disabled consumers. There is no need for
much data to employ a personalized default rule approach in this case, and
we would not be surprised to see courts reaching the same result through
interpretation techniques.
In some industries, a default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s residence”
could be an efficient minoritarian default rule, which would facilitate
personalized default rules. Thus, a store selling medical equipment, might
have a relatively high number – but still minority – of consumers who are
disabled. Some of the disabilities may be visually hidden, and the disabled
consumers might prefer not to disclose their disabilities verbally, especially
if other customers are nearby. A default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s
place” would encourage non-disabled consumers to ask for delivery at the
seller’s place, with a possible price discount.
2. Medical Malpractice
The personalized default approach could work in the medical
malpractice context. Suppose that a doctor has prescribed a drug that, when
taken for a prolonged period of time, causes a very unfortunate side effect
in a very small number of cases (say, one in every 500,000 cases). The drug
is most effective when taken for a prolonged period of time, but still
somewhat effective when taken for just a week or two. The doctor fails to
warn the patient about this particular side effect. A patient suffers the rare
side effect and then sues the doctor for malpractice, alleging a failure to
obtain informed consent. A key focus of the legal inquiry will be causation:
Would the patient have consented to undergo the treatment even if she had
been warned about the side effect? As long as the doctor has no concrete
information about the particular patient’s wishes or expectations regarding
disclosure, present law treats this inquiry as an objective one:
What would a reasonably prudent patient have done?84
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Our approach contemplates a rule whereby a physician can tailor her
disclosure of risks to particular patients – even though she has no concrete
information about the particular patient’s wishes or expectations regarding
disclosure. She will then be judged based on whether her disclosure was
appropriate for a particular patient type (not the hypothetical reasonably
prudent patient.)
Big Data firms like the Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) have already
gotten into the business of using data mining to predict patients’ future
behavior, with the firm having launched FICO Adherence Scoring recently.
FICO adherence scores use information from a patient’s credit report to
predict the likelihood that a patient will regularly take his prescription
medication and otherwise adhere to medical advice.85 Suppose a doctor
consulted a patient’s FICO adherence score and FICO predicted that there
was only a 5% chance that the patient would take the medication for long
enough to render the side effect a possibility. The doctor does some quick
math and determines that the risk that this particular patient would suffer
the side effect is 1 in 10 million. Given that any warning may cause
psychosomatic symptoms or raise the likelihood of cognitive errors by the
patient, the doctor elects not to warn the patient.86 On our analysis, a
default rule of non-disclosure would be appropriate for this particular
patient.
At the same time, if the same doctor was treating a different patient,
one for whom FICO predicted a 95% chance that the patient would
continue taking the medication for long enough to trigger a possible side
effect, then the court’s ruling could well come out differently. The odds of
the side effect occurring for this patient are approximately 1 in 526,000,
and those odds, while remote, might still be sufficient to warrant disclosure
to the patient. Personalizing the default rule permits the physician to
practice personalized medicine to a much greater degree, a development
that could substantially advance the efficiency of health care delivery.87
Pushing the point further, we might imagine ways in which other
forms of Big Data could affect the informed consent calculus. One of the
other things that credit scoring can do is assess an individual’s tolerance for
risk. Risk is apparently correlated across a number of life activities, such
that individuals who drive in a risky manner make risky personal financial
decisions as well.88 Suppose that a plaintiff’s consumer behavior profile
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reveals her to be an extremely cautious person. In that case the law might
impose heightened disclosure requirements on the physician. If the
patient’s profile reveals her to be a devil-may-care consumer, then giving
short shrift to disclosures of low risks may be appropriate for the physician
in a world where disclosure may be both time consuming and potentially
harmful to the patient’s emotional well-being. Such an approach to
adjudicating medical malpractice cases, where the patient’s profile at the
time the medication was prescribed is part of the factual record before the
court, may help steer adjudicators away from the dangers of hindsight bias.
In such cases the judge or jury knows that a bad outcome has occurred and
is tempted to think that a reasonable patient would have wanted to know
about the possibility of such an outcome, even though the ex ante risk of
such an outcome was extremely remote.89
The (hopefully rare) patient who is misunderstood by FICO or other
providers of analytics, would have the chance to opt out. Under a new
version of informed consent, the physician may tell a patient, “this is the
sort of person our analytics contractor thinks you are. If we have
misunderstood you, please tell us now, because it will affect the facts I
disclose to you and the circumstances that will prompt me to ask for further
consent or clarification.”90 We will say more about this sort of personalized
disclosure in Part IV.
In other contexts personalized informed consent default rules could
further the interests of third parties. Consider vaccination: children are
vaccinated from diseases but it is often in a particular child’s best interest,
strictly speaking, not to take the vaccine – which has possible side effects –
because the rest of the population is vaccinated. To avoid such free-riding a
mandatory law could force vaccination. A softer approach would be to
have an impersonal default rule according to which doctors could say
nothing about side effects, unless asked, and go forward with vaccination,
unless told otherwise. A still better approach in a world where, say, 80-90%
vaccination suffices to confer herd immunity and 10% of the population are
likely to suffer side effects from vaccination, would be to personalize the
disclosure default. For example, the “no information unless the patient
asked” default rule would not apply to patients whose attributes correlate
most closely with those patients who have suffered side effects in FDA
trials.
3. Landlord-Tenant Law
We believe that personalized default rules are appropriate in
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adjudication of disputes in property law as well. Suppose a landlord and
tenant are involved in litigation. The tenant lives alone and has rented a two
bedroom apartment for $600 a month in a neighborhood where the average
similarly sized apartment rents for twice that amount. The written lease
specifies the rent, the term, and various other factors, but says nothing
about the quality of the apartment. Now suppose that a few months after
the tenant moves in, plaster begins falling from the ceiling in the second
bedroom, causing it to be an unsafe space for sleeping, though the tenant
continues to use the bedroom for storing personal belongings. Has the
condition in the second bedroom amounted to a breach of the lease, such
that if the ceiling is not repaired upon request the tenant can move out and
need not pay further rent? In most American jurisdictions, the answer to
that question would be yes. The condition of the ceiling constitutes a
breach of the implied warranty of habitability, which is read into every
landlord-tenant contract.91 But some jurisdictions treat the implied warranty
of habitability as a default provision that the parties can waive via explicit
contract terms.92
American law has largely stuck with a one-size fits all approach to the
implied warranty of habitability, though the limited exceptions are
important for our purposes. As a general matter, the implied warranty of
habitability will be read into any residential lease. But some jurisdictions
hold that there will be no implied warranty of habitability when the tenant
rents a single family home (as opposed to a unit in a multi-unit building,)93
and other jurisdictions hold that there is nothing akin to an implied
warranty of habitability when non-residential properties are leased.94 This
granularity of the rules is based on suppositions by common law courts that
particular variables governing property ought to affect the tenant’s
substantive legal rights.95
Our approach to personalized default rules posits that the
characteristics of the tenant (and landlord) may be as relevant to
determining the appropriate missing term to impose on the contract,
particularly when the landlord has access to the information relating to the
tenant’s past behavior, characteristics, and traits, or to data indicating what
are the suitable default rules for the tenant. Is the tenant an individual who
routinely bargain hunts, and is willing to sacrifice quality in return for cost
savings? If so, the court plausibly ought to view the lease as lacking an
implied warranty of habitability. Is the tenant someone who regularly stays
91
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in nice hotels, pays for weekly maid service, and otherwise indicates a
propensity for paying for comfort and pleasing aesthetics? If so, the court
plausibly ought to view the lease as containing an implied warranty of
habitability. Does the tenant score high on personality metrics measuring
Neuroticism, such that the prospect of problems with the ceiling will keep
her awake at night, or is she a highly emotionally stable person who may be
annoyed but won’t be made anxious by her substandard ceiling?
We are not suggesting that these intuitive correlations among
purchasing history, personality, and expectations for an apartment are airtight. We are articulating falsifiable hypotheses that ought to be tested
empirically. But consumer profilers have been able to analyze a broad
swath of personal information relating to transactions, and to use
algorithms to identify “value oriented” or “Rodeo Drive Chic” consumers
for marketing purposes since at least the mid-1990s.96
4. Labor Law
American labor law is not often thought of in terms of default rules,
but defaults are very important in that field. More precisely, the default
provision under the National Labor Relations Act is that workers are not
unionized. If a group of workers mounts a unionization drive and a
majority of the workers (or, in some cases, a majority of a subset of the
non-management workers) within a workplace vote to unionize, then a
union will be certified, and it will be authorized to bargain collectively on
behalf of all the workers as a whole.97 Union certification efforts can be
cumbersome, expensive, and contentious. At the same time, it seems
plausible that the default rule American law has chosen is an appropriate
one on majoritarian grounds – most American workers are non-unionized
and have chosen to be non-unionized for quite some time.98
Psychological studies have shown that personality characteristics
correlate strongly with membership in a voluntary union. In particular, the
Big Five traits of Extraversion and Neuroticism both predict union
membership, and the interaction of those two traits predicts union
membership very strongly.99 Big Five personality characteristics also
predict which industries individuals are likely to be drawn to, and which
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individuals are most likely to thrive and retain their jobs in particular
industries. For example, nurses who report high levels of Neuroticism are
much more likely to experience emotional exhaustion and burnout, which
may cause them to leave nursing, though nurses with high levels of
Extraversion are likely to avoid burnout.100 While politicians score very
high on Extraversion and Openness, bureaucrats in the same jurisdictions
do not.101 Managers and sales representatives show high levels of
Extraversion,102 and high levels of Neuroticism appear to be common
among the unemployed.103
This kind of data suggests a radical possibility, which is that certain
workplaces or industries, especially those containing high numbers of very
extraverted and neurotic individuals, might be deemed unionized by
default.104 Given the underrepresentation of highly neurotic individuals in
the workforce, the non-unionized default plausibly makes sense for most
workplaces.
At this point we want to identify this kind of workplace profiling to
determine the default rule as a theoretical possibility, rather than something
we are advocating. Correlations and causation are distinct, and the factors
that drive union membership continue to be debated.105 For example, it is
plausible that Extraversion and Neuroticism explain the success of
unionization campaigns, rather than workers’ underlying preference for
union membership. It is even conceivable that correlation runs in the
opposite direction, and participation in a union makes workers more
extroverted and neurotic. We would need to get a fuller sense of these
causal variables before offering prescriptions for labor law. That said,
depending on the results of future research, a pro-unionization default rule
could be appropriate in some contexts.
C. Big Data Guinea Pigs
Countries with enormous populations ought to take advantage of
100
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economies of scale. In this case that means foregoing the need to carefully
monitor the choices of all their citizens, and perhaps sidestepping some of
the problems from inefficient social norms in the process. We therefore
propose that American law ask one million residents to make active choices
about their preferences, provide modest compensation to these guinea pigs
for the transaction costs they have incurred, and then data mine to identify
ways in which the 314 million individual Americans are similar to any of
the 1 million guinea pigs.106 The guinea pigs’ active choices would become
the personalized default choices for the people most similar to them across
a variety of observable metrics. These surveys could be conducted via a
government agency, like the Census Bureau or United States Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, or an industry consortium.
A great deal of contract law scholarship worries about the extent to
which consumers are rushed or inattentive and pay little attention to
contract terms as a result.107 Yet if one in every 314 people is a
compensated contract law guinea pig,108 then the law might reasonably
devote substantial resources to making sure that those guinea pigs are very
well-informed and have adequate time to consider the contractual options
and associated tradeoffs. They can spend time reading the fine print so we
don’t have to. And once we have a large dataset tracking the choices of
these guinea pigs, we can identify behavioral patterns and give each
consumer contractual terms that mimic those chosen by the guinea pigs
with the personalities and attributes most similar to hers. Only the choices
made by the guinea pigs prior to the time the contract at issue was executed
would matter.
Our “sampling” strategy mirrors the sorts of extrapolations used
routinely by demographers and survey researchers.109 Such strategies are
already used for predictive purposes in the private sector. For example,
Netflix’s Cinematch algorithm for movie ratings (a) analyzes the one- to
five-star ratings provided by its users after they have seen a movie, (b)
matches each user’s ratings against the ratings of other users in the Netflix
database, and (c) uses these similarity scores to predict how well users will
like particular movies, so that users can employ these predictions in
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deciding whether they ought to rent or download a movie.110 The more
films a user rates, the better the algorithm can personalize that user’s movie
recommendations and the recommendations of similar Netflix customers.
Of course, rating each movie you have watched on Netflix entails an
active choice. Many users of Netflix do not bother to evaluate movies they
have seen, perhaps because it takes time to do so.111 And many Netflix
users similarly do not use the “taste preferences” features on Netflix, which
permit users to specify how often they watch movies that can be
characterized as “absurd,” “bawdy,” “cerebral,” “dark”, etc.112 One of the
potential benefits of personalized default rules in a world of Big Data is
that much of the data used to generate similarity scores and personalized
defaults will be generated automatically, without the need for a user to do
anything. It is almost tantamount to Netflix monitoring how many times a
viewer laughed during a comedy, cried during a tragedy, or gasped during a
horror flick.
A more modest alternative to guinea pigs would be to generate
information necessary for personalizing default rules by asking individuals
about their general preferences, characteristics and traits, and using this
information to tailor default rules for them. An agency might distribute
questionnaires to consumers, explaining that the answers will be used for
personalizing default rules in their interactions with merchants. We predict
that many consumers will answer the questionnaires, which should not be
too intrusive, with the understanding that their answers would facilitate
their receiving deals better adapted to their true preferences. The gist of the
approach is to use information culled from a survey to modify all the
defaults that a consumer will encounter. This blanket approach to
personalizing default rules seems far more efficient than selective
modifications of contractual boilerplate on a transaction-by-transaction
basis.
In any event, in modern, high-stakes transactions it is becoming
increasingly common for sellers to have information about the consumers
they are dealing with, so that they can decide on pricing and service
quality, pinpoint potentially fraudulent transactions, and evaluate the
effectiveness of their marketing strategies.113 As the information age
proceeds, it will be reasonable to assume that sellers “know their
customers” and either already are or can easily become familiar with the
personalized default rules that correspond to particular customers.
110
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Consumers are less likely to have this sort of information about
individual firms’ propensities, though in the case of large national firms or
local firms with extensive Yelp profiles, the information asymmetries may
be less pronounced. Imposing on consumers a burden to “know their
sellers” is less justifiable, particularly when they are dealing with smallscale sellers in non-repeat-play environments.114

III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Part II articulated a rather bold vision of personalized default rules. In
this part, we want to confront some potential objections to our proposal,
conceding that some of them warrant limits on the appropriate scope for
personalized default rules.
A. Cross Subsidies
An obvious objection to our proposal relates to the equities of crosssubsidization. In our analysis, two consumers might buy the same product
for the same price and, ex post, receive a different set of contractual rights
as part of that transaction. In such circumstances it is tempting to critique
our proposal by emphasizing the cross-subsidy from the buyer who
receives less generous contractual terms to the buyer who receives more
generous contractual terms. Consider the following example:
Example 3: Right to Return. Dana is conservative, very careful in
her behavior in all fields of life. She is a cautious consumer:
before she buys anything, she consults Consumer Reports and
asks for her friends’ advice. In the past, she has never returned a
product she bought, unless it was defective. Jim is a risk-taker,
quite impulsive, and is easily excited. He makes decisions fast,
without consulting anyone. In the past he returned products he
bought several times, just because he realized he should not have
bought them in the first place. Both Dana and Jim have separately
bought at the same store a new flat-screen television. After a day
of use they realized that this purchase was a mistake. They want
to return the product and get their money back. Should they be
treated in the same manner?
Under current law, the answer is yes. Whether the default rule is a
“right to return”115 or “no right to return,” it would be applied equally to
Dana and Jim. If, however, personalized default rules are permitted and
114
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feasible, it might be the case that only Dana should be entitled to return the
product and get her money back, while Jim would not be allowed to do so.
The reason is simple: if Dana and Jim had separately negotiated the right to
return with the seller, the outcome would probably be different in the two
cases; while Dana might have preferred to have that right, Jim might have
preferred not to have it.
At first glance this might seem odd: Jim appears to need the right to
return more than Dana. But that “urgent” need is contingent on the current
default rule under which both Dana and Jim are entitled to the right to
return, and pay the same premium – through the contract price – for having
that right. Under the current default rule, careful Dana subsidizes hasty Jim.
This is so because Dana rarely uses her right to return while Jim uses it
very often, but they pay the same premium. If instead, only Dana would be
entitled to use that right, since she uses it very rarely, the crosssubsidization would be diminished. Indeed, the cross-subsidization would
disappear if the contract price – or other terms in the contracts – reflected
the value of the right to return to the specific buyer.
B. Strategic Behavior
Crude personalized default rules tied to an individual’s immutable
characteristics, such as sex or age, alleviate significant concerns about
strategic behavior. Under our proposal for granular personalized default
rules, however, the products and services that an individual buys, the
keywords he searches for, the company he keeps, and various other aspects
of an individual’s behavior can influence the terms under which he will
purchase goods and services. When an individual consumer changes his
behavior, he is simultaneously changing the identities of the guinea pigs to
whom he will be compared. In effect, the consumer trades in the default
rules selected by the guinea pigs who behaved similarly to him at an earlier
date for the default rules selected by the guinea pigs who behaved similarly
to the “new him.” Given this possibility, there is a danger that individual
consumers will engage in strategic behavior, so that they are compared to
the guinea pigs who have selected the most generous default terms.
To take a salient example of this, a Canadian credit card issuer
determined during the last decade that consumers who purchase carbon
monoxide detectors or felt pads to be placed at the bottom of chair and
furniture legs are exceptionally good credit risks.116 Evidently, people
concerned about the dangers of carbon monoxide or preventing scratches
on hard wood floors are extremely careful, conscientious individuals with
low discount rates; precisely the sort of people likely to pay back loans on
time.117 Before it publicized this finding, the credit card issuer could use
116
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knowledge of felt pad and carbon monoxide detector purchases to price
risk. But as soon as the correlation became public, its value diminished
substantially. After all, felt pads and carbon monoxide detectors are
relatively inexpensive compared to home mortgages loans. It would be in
everyone’s interests to stock up on these household products a few months
before seeking to purchase a home, even if they had no intention of putting
these items to their ordinary use. The strategic purchase of these felt pads
and carbon monoxide detectors would therefore function as a smoke
screen.118
Although the problem of strategic behavior is always an issue, we do
not think it is a particularly troublesome one in this context. First, a great
deal of predictive analytics is and will remain proprietary. Guessing which
products function as felt pads will not be easy, and people who discover
how to game the system will have little incentive to publicly disclose their
success stories. Second, even when it becomes clear that certain types of
behavior will be associated with more beneficial default terms in some
contexts, employing smokescreens is costly. If people regularly purchase
products they don’t need, become Facebook friends with people they don’t
like, or develop hobbies they don’t enjoy so as to enhance the quality of
their personalized default profiles, they often will be making themselves
worse off. Changing one’s behavior is a costly signal; it is not cheap talk.
Much of the time it will be easier to just specify a different contractual term
at the time a contract is entered into, or pay a higher price, rather than
putting on an elaborate and costly performance to achieve the same result.
Third, while keeping up a charade may be easy for a short period of time, it
gets harder for the consumer (and easier to detect by the seller) with every
passing day. Thus, in Example 3 (Right to Return), if hasty Jim pretended
to be careful Jim, and got a right to return, after several instances of
abusing that right, merchants would recognize his true character and treat
him accordingly. Fourth, on many occasions consumers will not really
benefit from pretending to be what they are not: having a specific character
could benefit a consumer in one context but harm him in another context,
and on many occasions would bring him a default rule that does not fit him
personally.
While we think strategic behavior is a manageable problem associated
with personalized default rules, the problem would be magnified if
personalization expanded beyond waivable defaults. It is possible that
personalized default rules will become so engrained that sellers essentially
refuse to bargain around them. In other words, firms might be willing to
offer consumers contracts with personalized terms, but might view
negotiation away from those personalized terms as prohibitive on
transaction cost grounds. Such a development, away from personalized
default rules and towards unwaivable “personalized terms” strikes us a
118
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sufficiently thorny topic to warrant an article of its own. We suspect society
is unlikely to need to cross that bridge, at least in the immediate future, in
part because the strategic behavior problem would be substantially
magnified in a world where most terms were non-negotiable.
C. Uncertainty
According to a third objection, adopting a personalized default rules
regime increases uncertainty thereby making the law less effective in
guiding people’s behavior. It may also increase the costs of adjudication.119
Impersonal default rules avoid these drawbacks.
Uncertainty would be ameliorated by approaches to contract law that
lock in the choices made by guinea pigs prior to the contract’s execution.
Any subsequent shifts in the choices of guinea pigs would be irrelevant to
the meaning of a contract. That is the approach we advocate here.
Mechanically, a consumer would be entitled to ask at the point of sale what
personalized terms are dictated by her consumer profile, and the firm
would respond with a disclosure of those terms. Because the entire process
would be automated, the production of this information for consumers
would not slow down transactions. The consumer’s review of default terms
might slow down the transaction, but the same is true of existing, written
contract terms.
To better understand the uncertainty objection to a personalized
default rules regime, reconsider Example 3 (Right to Return). If there is a
“one size fits all” default rule, of either a right to return or no right to
return, contractual parties could clearly understand whether in a specific
transaction they have such a right. In the same way, if the choice of remedy
is not contingent on the buyers’ characteristics and traits, in Example 2
(Damages or Specific Performance), both Steven and Sarah could know in
advance that in the event of a breach they are entitled to specific
performance (or damages), regardless of the inferences which could be
derived from their particular traits. With personalized default rules there is
more uncertainty: in the two abovementioned examples, contractual parties
would find it harder to contemplate their substantive rights and remedies.120
The choice between personalized default rules and impersonal default
rules only loosely tracks the choice between rules and standards, which has
been thoroughly analyzed by commentators.121 Most importantly, rules are
more costly to create while standards are more costly for individuals to
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interpret when deciding how to behave and for adjudicator to apply to past
behaviors.122 At first glance an impersonal default rule seems to resemble a
rule, while a personalized default rule seems to resemble a standard. Thus,
in Examples 3 and 2 which are mentioned above, an impersonal default
rule (such as “right to return” or “damages”, respectively) is a rule, while a
personalized default rule is a standard.
The rules versus standards dichotomy is not identical to the
impersonal versus personalized default rules dichotomy. In particular, there
could be impersonal default rules which are standards (e.g., a duty of good
faith) and personalized default rules which are rules (e.g., different
intestacy rules for men and women).123 Therefore, the crucial question with
personalized default rules is how to balance uncertainty with accuracy, to
better reduce transaction costs, encourage desirable behaviors, and meet
people’s reasonable expectations.
Would a personalized default rule be typically associated with less
certainty than an impersonal default rule? Not necessarily. A consumer
living in a world with impersonal default rules needs to invest resources in
learning the contents of the default rule (or bear the risks of not doing so).
A consumer living in a world with personalized default rules needs to
invest resources in learning the content of whichever default rule applies to
him, and he may need to research other plausibly applicable default rules
along the way. Critically, the consumer already knows a great deal about
his preferences and characteristics, which are the factors driving the choice
among multiple personalized default rules. Assuming that Big Data does
what it is supposed to do – identify patterns of behavior among similarly
situated people – then the consumer will be able to intuit the law’s
contents, based on what he, himself, would want, which would be a good
proxy for what guinea pigs just like him chose. It is therefore conceivable
that the average consumer can discern the contents of applicable
personalized default rules at a lower cost than he can discern the contents
of an impersonal default rule, and that there is a greater likelihood he can
do so without consulting a lawyer.124
A caveat is in order. In our model the guinea pigs will be given more
time and resources to make decisions, and it is conceivable that this extra
time will cause them to make decisions that differ from the snap judgments
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they (and those like them) would have made. If this gap is large, the effect
will be greater consumer uncertainty combined with greater consumer
satisfaction with their default choices. That seems likely to be, at worst, a
wash. Over time, it is conceivable that many consumers will stop worrying
so much about uncertainty, in the same way that consumers quickly
overcame their widespread initial reluctance to purchase products over the
Internet using credit cards.125 For those consumers who remain untrusting,
our proposal for personalized disclosure in Part IV offers a novel strategy
for ameliorating the uncertainty problem.
In contracts between two consumers, especially consumers involved in
non-repeat play interactions, the uncertainty will rise dramatically, which is
why we are quite skeptical about using personalized default rules in those
contexts. But in contracts between a consumer and a profit-maximizing
firm, or between consumers involved in repeat-play interactions, the
cognitive load faced directly by consumers should be more manageable.126
Contracting firms may face information asymmetries regarding consumer
preferences, but obviously reducing those asymmetries is one of the Big
Data industry’s chief objectives.
Of course, if judges are not skilled at identifying litigants’
characteristics and preferences, then the cognitive loads faced by
adjudicators will rise as a result of the shift from impersonal default rules to
personalized default rules. And as these cognitive loads rise, the risk of
judicial error rises, which will engender uncertainty for the parties
themselves, even if these parties have perfect information about their own
preferences and characteristics. As this analysis shows, the heightened
uncertainty created by personalized default rules is likely to emerge
indirectly, as a “shadow of the law” effect.
Even if personalized default rules invariably enhance uncertainty in
litigation because of these dynamics, there are plenty of cases where
personalized default rules promote accuracy, with little effect on certainty.
For example, in our contemplated scenario of a transaction between a firm
and a consumer, the firm knows what terms a particular consumer is
entitled to at the time of the purchase. The law could require the
preservation of these terms, even if the consumer does not ask to see her
personalized default terms. In the event of a subsequent dispute, the court
would have as much access to the personalized terms as it would to the
written contract, so the uncertainty associated with interpretation would be
no greater than normal. Nor is the uncertainty concern a serious one with
our inheritance law example and other cases where the default rule is
tailored according to a salient and easily observable characteristic such as
125
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sex or age. Where a personalized rule is particular to a defined social group
(e.g., a default of no organ donation among Shintos), we can expect that
group members will learn the contents of the crude personalized default
rule without having to investigate it.127 That brings us to a closely related
objection: caselaw fragmentation, which is our next topic.
D. Caselaw Fragmentation
Impersonal default rules minimize the fragmentation of the case law
that resolves contractual ambiguity. That is a key advantage. Personalized
default rules, by contrast, would engender greater fragmentation in the
legal precedents. That feature is a real drawback associated with
personalized default rules, one that may prove decisive in some cases.
Presently, if a court interprets ambiguous contractual language, its
interpretation will possess precedential value and help clarify the law in
future disputes arising out of ambiguity. The precedential effect is most
powerful with respect to any future dispute arising between the same
parties concerning the same ambiguity. In such a case, the earlier precedent
has preclusive effect. Even here, though, the same contractual language
may be construed to mean different things if the court identifies pertinent
differences in the context of the negotiation.128 Certainly, however, the
interpretation of language will play a significant role in mitigating
subsequent judicial uncertainty about the language’s meaning in future
disputes.129 But the precedent may help reduce uncertainty with respect to
similarly situated parties and similar contractual ambiguities. To be sure,
lawyers and judges will be able to distinguish precedents that are closely on
point if they are sufficiently motivated to do so, but the greater the
similarity in the language at issue the more difficult it will be to do so on
contextual or other grounds.
With personalized default rules, distinguishing a precedent a judge
does not like becomes easier. Even if the contractual language at issue in an
earlier case is identical to the language at issue in the case before the court,
a party might appropriately argue that the litigant in the earlier case and the
litigant in the subsequent case have sufficiently different personalities,
attributes, and profiles to warrant divergent interpretations of the
127
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ambiguity. No two human beings are identical in every respect, so the court
will have to confront the question of whether litigant heterogeneity
warrants a different result in the face of linguistic and contextual
homogeneity. This fragmentation of precedent seems poised to enhance
uncertainty about the law’s content. Where this problem is particularly
pronounced it warrants skepticism with respect to personalized default
rules.
The question is one of tradeoffs, and it is not obvious whether the
costs associated with indirect uncertainty and caselaw fragmentation
exceed the benefits associated with giving a far greater number of
individuals default rules that approximate their preferences more closely
than impersonal default rules presently do (if one adopts the majoritarian
default rule theory). To the extent that readers are concerned about
excessive fragmentation, they might support a scaled back version of our
proposal, whereby personalized default rules could be employed only to
deal with contractual silence, and not to deal with contractual ambiguity.
Under this modified approach, identical contractual language would usually
mean identical things to different people, but the absence of a contractual
provision would have differing implications for different parties.
It is worth noting that courts have occasionally confronted this issue
of fragmentation before. In one prominent en banc decision, the Federal
Circuit held that interpreting identical contractual language to mean
different things in different contexts was justified, despite protests about
the extent to which such results will destabilize existing contracts.130 If
such an approach to interpretation is occasionally permissible when courts
are engaged in ex post holistic analyses of contractual meaning, then it
ought to be more palatable if undertaken in a rigorous, data-driven, ex ante
way, which is our aspiration in advocating personalized default rules.131 We
therefore conclude that uncertainty and precedent fragmentation are
important but not inevitably decisive considerations in deciding on the
desirability of personalized default rules.
E. Statistics and Stereotyping
A possible objection to our proposal is similar to the one raised
against profiling in law enforcement, or more generally, against the usage
of statistical data for determining rights and duties. Statistical data does not
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focus on the individual parties; instead, it purports to establish factual
findings, and allocating rights and duties, by using generalizations
concerning the group to which the individuals belong, e.g., their sex, age,
race, religion, or any other indicator correlated with the missing facts.132
This may contradict many people’s moral intuitions. Furthermore, using
statistical data create stereotypes, by ascribing to people attributes they may
not have.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the pros and cons of
using statistical data for allocating rights and duties, and for law
enforcement. We note, however, that any default rule, impersonal or
personalized, is statistical in nature, because it ascribes rights and duties to
individuals according to averaged preferences of an entire population or a
subset of people. Personalized default rules are just a better proxy – based
on more accurate statistics – as to the preferences of the specific party.
Therefore, the objection to our proposal is not the usage of statistical
data as such – this kind of data should be used anyway with any type of
default rules – but instead that it creates stereotypes we may want to avoid.
Take the intestacy example: using different default rules for men and
women, according to which, when there is no will, most of a mother’s
estate goes to the children while most of the fathers’ estate goes to their
spouses could create (or strengthen) a stereotype that mothers care more
about their children than fathers. We consider this objection in the next
section.
F. Subordination, Adaptive Preferences, and Personalization
Sunstein’s paper on default rules provides an arresting example of an
American default rule that may be simultaneously anti-majoritarian and
constitutionally compelled. Sunstein draws on fascinating work by Liz
Emens,133 which shows that 80-90% of American women change their
surnames when they get married, but trivial numbers of men do so.134 An
obvious potential implication of this data is that a personalized default rule
is appropriate. Changing one’s name is time-consuming,135 but most
women will adopt their husband’s name upon marriage, so the law could
just presume that women adopt their husband’s names, while providing an
opt-out for women who wish to retain their names or hyphenate their last
names. Men’s default would be no name change, again with an option to
override that default upon request.
Sunstein contemplates the possibility of using a personalized
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majoritarian default for women’s marital name changes, but then rejects the
idea, noting that “a default rule of this kind would be discriminatory, and it
would almost certainly be found unconstitutional.”136 While Emens does
not deem unconstitutional a waivable default rule presuming women
wanted to change their names, she does say that compulsory name changes
for women would be unconstitutional,137 and she makes a persuasive
feminist case that state rules increasing the likelihood that women will
adopt their husbands’ surnames are normatively undesirable.138 We will
explore the descriptive constitutional claim shortly, but let us address the
normative issue first.
We are sympathetic to Emens’s concerns about pressuring women to
change their names in light of the sexist history of name changing
conventions. We also share her concern that adaptive preferences may be
causing women to change their names.139 These strike us as good reasons
for the law to continue employing an impersonal default rule according to
which marriage does not entail a surname change.140 Many women will
continue to change their names, overcoming the stickiness of the law’s
default term.141 But nearly everything associated with marriage entails
undoing a default choice. The default choice is to remain single. Once one
decides to get married, the default choice is not to serve food at the
wedding, to forego flowers, to wear pajamas during the ceremony (or no
clothing at all!), and to send no thank-you notes after receiving gifts. In
short, defaults are not really relevant in these high-stakes settings. The
point is simply that if the state adopts a popular but inegalitarian default,
the result may reinforce existing gender inequality, both because of the
power of inertia142 and the expressive dimensions of the law.143 We
therefore agree with Emens and Sunstein that a crude personalized default,
with gender as the only variable,144 is normatively unattractive.
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We think a more compelling case can be made for a granular
personalized default rule. If one examines the name change data on which
Emens relied, one sees that there are various demographic characteristics
that substantially affect the probability that a spouse will adopt her
husband’s name upon marriage. A study of female Harvard alumni showed
that 20% of them kept their surnames, whereas a study of the overall
population found only 10% of married women did so, and a more recent
study of New York Times wedding announcements found that 29% of
marrying women whose vows were written up in the paper of record were
keeping their surnames.145 Women with advanced degrees, women who
married or became mothers later in life, graduates of elite universities, and
women whose husbands have PhDs were more likely to retain their
surnames.146 Daughters of academics were also more likely to retain their
surnames.147
Interestingly, demographic variables affecting name changes interact
in somewhat surprising ways. Education levels were highly predictive of
whether Caucasian women would retain their surnames, but going to
college had no affect on African American women’s choices about keeping
their surnames, and African American women generally retain their
surnames at significantly higher rates than Caucasian women.148
In light of this substantial variation, how should one feel about a
highly granular personalized default rule? Suppose it turned out that
Caucasian women who regularly shop at Wal-Mart, frequently dine at
Cracker Barrel, dropped out of college, and are marrying spouses with
similar characteristics adopt their husband’s surnames 98% of the time, but
that African American women who have Masters Degrees in Education,
subscribe to the Vegetarian Times and Mother Jones, and take yoga classes
adopt their husband’s surnames only 7% of the time. Would it be
normatively undesirable for the state to adopt as a default rule the
assumption that Caucasian women with those characteristics would see
their surnames changed upon marriage but these African American women
would not? Imagine the data were to show that 88% of male, vegan, Prius
drivers with PhDs in Philosophy adopt their wives’ surnames upon
marriage. Why not flip the default for these husbands to a name change
unless they opted out?
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The red tape associated with a name change is non-trivial,149 and it
may be that at some point the demographic markers of an individual’s
preferences with respect to name changes are sufficiently strong that we
need not worry so much about the law’s expressive effects. Crude
personalized default rules that are dependent on mere stereotypes are
undesirable, but granular personalized default rules based on hard data and
sound science may be desirable. Particularly if data miners can drill down
and find a set of men whose names ought to be changed by default, then
even the expressive dimensions of the law may be ambiguous. What’s
more, the law’s discomfort with relying exclusively on problematic
classifications like race and gender may become less pronounced if those
factors are mixed with a number of non-suspect classifications to generate a
default rule.150
Even crude, gender-based personalized decision rules may be
appropriate when the dangers of reinforcing an inegalitarian gender norm
are minor. Nguyen v. INS is one of the key precedents governing the law’s
use of gender proxies. At issue in Nguyen was a government policy that
imposed greater burdens on those seeking American citizenship who claim
to be the children of United States citizens born out of wedlock.
Illegitimate children of American citizen fathers born out of wedlock could
only become citizens if their fathers legally legitimated them, if their
fathers declared their paternity under oath, or if a court order determined
their paternity.151 Maternity was presumed for mothers.
Given the law’s structure, the gender discriminatory provision
functioned as a default rule. While women’s offspring were presumed to be
citizens, men had to opt in to citizenship (via a declaration of paternity or
legitimation) to receive the same rights for their offspring. The Supreme
Court held that the gender classification was justified by two factors: first,
the government’s interest in assuring that the person claiming citizenship
and the American citizen father are indeed biologically related, and,
second, the state interest in assuring that the person claiming citizenship
has a meaningful relationship with the American citizen parent and, by
extension, with the United States.152 The majority rejected the idea that its
decision was based on outmoded gender stereotypes:
There is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the
moment of birth – a critical event in the statutory scheme and in
the whole tradition of citizenship law – the mother’s knowledge of
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the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way
not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a
stereotype.153
The Court proceeded to hold that placing additional burdens in the
path of the illegitimate children of U.S. citizen fathers was substantially
related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. The court
emphasized that “Congress has not erected inordinate and unnecessary
hurdles to the conferral of the children of citizen fathers in furthering its
important objectives.”154 The burdens placed on an applicant for citizenship
and the burdens placed on a woman defaulted into a surname change she
wishes to avoid are comparable. The key consideration for the court would
be whether accepting a default rule for surnames that is consistent with
most American women’s preferences is “marked by misconception and
prejudice” or shows “disrespect for either class”155 if there is some reason
to believe that the preferences in question are adaptive, and were shaped by
a history of patriarchy.
In light of Nguyen, we do not think it is certain that the
implementation of a crude personalized default rule for surname changes
upon marriage would be unconstitutional as a positive matter; the question
strikes us as a close one. We continue to think that such a rule is
undesirable for reasons that feminist legal scholars like Emens have
articulated. Having said that, a nice advantage of granular personalized
default rules, as opposed to crude gender-based distinctions is that it may
be easier to achieve doctrinal and popular consensus around such solutions
. . . at least in a world where people do not care much about information
privacy. A classic efficiency versus equity tradeoff thus arises. Crude
personalized default rules, which nicely mitigate the uncertainty problem
associated with personalization, compound the constitutional problems
associated with personalization.
We can generalize from Emens’s example of name changes to any
legal regime that incorporates a protected classification like race or gender
into a granular personalized default rule. It is reasonable to survey the
history of the state’s race and gender discrimination and conclude that such
classifications ought to rarely be part of the state’s efforts to generate
default rules. Indeed, as Sunstein notes, a major variable in determining
whether the use of personalized default rules is appropriate is the
trustworthiness of the “choice architects” who will frame and determine the
contents of these rules.156 On the other hand, because gender and race can
be reliable predictors of current preferences and future behavior, excluding
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these variables from an algorithm entirely leaves a great deal of predictive
power on the table. It seems plausible that most people would prefer an
algorithm that knows their race and gender and, as a result, more accurately
predicts their preferences over a system that excludes their race and gender
from consideration, and, as a result provides them with less accurate default
rules. Finally, it is worth underscoring the fragmented nature of the
precedents in the gender- and race-discrimination context. The Supreme
Court seems to be animated by different concerns in race and gender cases,
and antidiscrimination law is far from coherent as a result. While we think
Nguyen’s defaults are the most closely on point precedent, a comprehensive
explanation of the constitutionality of personalized default rules would
require a law review article unto itself.
G. Privacy
Information privacy restrictions make it more difficult to generate
personalized default rules.157 Without the ability to track individuals online,
access to comprehensive public and private databases, and various other
Big Data strategies, it will be quite difficult for firms and courts to generate
personalized default rules. In the European Union, where regulators have
generally taken a much harder line on data privacy than their American
counterparts,158 such restrictions could well thwart the development of
personalized default rules.
The privacy literature has long recognized the tradeoffs that
information privacy entails. Scholars have explored the tension between
privacy and security,159 privacy and antidiscrimination,160 privacy and
gender equality,161 and privacy and innovation.162 We can understand the
privacy and personalization tradeoff in similar terms. One of the
unanticipated consequences of aggressive data privacy regulations will be a
shift towards impersonal default rules and away from personalized default
rules, shifts from granular personalized default rules to crude personalized
default rules, and (as we shall see) shifts from personalized disclosure to
impersonalized disclosure.
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The industry attack on “Do Not Track” rules that would govern the
collection of information about consumers’ Internet activities has been
largely focused on the benefits of personalized ads to consumers, as well as
their obvious benefits to industry. Making consumers aware of the potential
benefits from personalized defaults and personalized disclosure may, in the
long run, prompt fewer consumers to elect to thwart tracking. After all,
most consumers bring strongly pragmatic perspectives to privacy tradeoffs,
and they are increasingly willing to share information about themselves
when the benefits from sharing are greater and the threats from sharing are
diminished.163 There is obviously another potential wrinkle here as well.
The primary debate over Do Not Track has surrounded the appropriate
default rules. Industry groups are open to permitting individuals to opt out
of tracking, but they want to require an affirmative step by consumers to
reject a pro-tracking default rule embedded in web browsers. Many
marketing firms have said they will not honor Do Not Track requests sent
by consumers using Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, which turns on Do Not
Track by default.164
Paradoxically, we believe that one way around the current stalemate
may be to use our lack of privacy in order to further privacy interests. If a
consumer’s existing profile reveals that she cares a great deal about her
own information privacy, and if her behavior mirrors that of guinea pigs
who chose to protect their own privacy online, then it should be
straightforward to enable Do Not Track by default for that user. Similarly,
if a consumer’s existing profile reveals little concern for privacy and
characteristics similar to those of guinea pigs who decided to enable
tracking online, then permitting tracking ought to be the appropriate default
option. Such use of personalized defaults is appealing in contexts like
online privacy, where defaults appear to be very sticky.165 Note that
although enforcing a Do Not Track rule against firms is costly, enforcing
an evidentiary rule limiting the admissibility of information gleaned from
tracking to affect the personalized default rule that applies to a particular
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consumer is straightforward. Familiar problems of adverse selection and
unraveling will remain, with bad-credit types and high-privacy-concern
types potentially becoming pooled,166 but that is not a problem unique to
personalization. At the margins, the benefits of personalized default rules
will prompt more consumers to surrender private information, a
development that is positive in efficiency terms but problematic to theorists
who argue that privacy produces positive externalities.167
Two more points about privacy are worth underscoring here. First, our
proposal is to use personalized default rules in adjudication. Litigants
essentially have no privacy in the United States. Indeed, the lack of privacy
protections in American litigation is a common source of strenuous
complaints from our European counterparts,168 and the effort to reconcile,
say, European data privacy protections with American civil discovery rules
prompts a fair bit of litigation.169 Pushing the point further, it is plausible
that substituting the automated analysis of a litigant’s consumption choices
for the possibility of intrusive questioning of the litigant in depositions and
interrogatories may be a privacy gain, rather than a privacy loss. On the
other hand, the greatest impact of our proposal for personalized default
rules in adjudication would be its effect on disputes arising in the shadow
of the law.170 In these settings, the shift towards personalization is almost
certainly associated with diminished privacy. We are skeptical that the
American government will enact meaningful protections for consumer
privacy any time soon. To those who view that reality as a dark cloud, our
Article suggests a previously unrecognized silver lining.
H. “But I Can Change!”
Before turning to a further extension of personalization, we hope to
clarify one last point about our proposal for personalized default rules.
Sunstein notes that the “best default rules or settings for a particular person,
in one year, might be very different from those in the next year. In
principle, the default rules could change on a daily or even hourly basis.”171
We are skeptical about the underlying assumptions of this objection. We
166

See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a
Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1161-82 (2011); Strahilevitz, supra note
54, at __.
167

See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999); Paul
M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004).

168

James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1157 (2004).
169

Tania Abbas, Note, U.S. Preservation Requirements and EU Data Protection: Headed
for Collision?, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257 (2013).
170

See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
171

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 23.

48

PERSONALIZING DEFAULT RULES AND DISCLOSURE

think that most choices about default rules are driven by personality
characteristics and values, which tend to be rather stable once people reach
adulthood. That said, we do recognize that people sometimes change in
ways that might cause them to want wholesale revisions in their
preferences.
We therefore want to underscore that personalization is itself a default
rule that can be waived. Suppose a consumer has a change of heart. She
recognizes in the past that she has been risk-seeking, inattentive, and price
insensitive. A divorce, or a bankruptcy, or a stint in rehab convinces her
that she ought to turn over a new leaf. Under our proposal she need not be
stuck with the choices made by her former self. To escape the
consequences of her consumer profile, she may specify that she rejects
personalized defaults. She can specify that she instead wants to contract for
the impersonal majoritarian default rule, or an impersonal minoritarian
default rule, or randomized selection of default rules, or any other set of
decision rules to which the counter-party might agree. Indeed, with the
consent of the counterparty, a consumer might specify via contract that the
contract will be governed by the personalized default rules that would
apply to a (presumably admirably rational) third party. “We hereby reject
the Porat-Strahilevitz proposal for personalized default rules as a basis for
interpreting this contract” would be a valid and enforceable contractual
provision, as would “We hereby agree that the promisee shall be entitled to
the personalized default rules that would apply were this to be a contract
between the promisor and Ralph Nader.”

IV. PERSONALIZED DISCLOSURE
The question of default rules has long vexed legal scholars and
prompted an enormous academic literature. In recent years, the topic of
disclosures has become another hotbed of legal scholarship. In particularly
noteworthy recent work, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider have argued
that disclosure to consumers rarely achieves what its advocates claim, in
part because disclosures have a pronounced tendency to grow longer and
more complicated over time.172 Disclosure mandates accumulate in
legislation and regulations, and as a result the disclosures themselves get so
lengthy and cumbersome that consumers stop reading them entirely.
Our “personalized disclosure” solution to the problems that BenShahar and Schneider identify should be obvious to readers by now, and it
is surprising that it is an approach largely absent from the broader literature
on disclosure. We have shown earlier how personalization might improve
doctor-patient disclosures in the health sector.173 In this Part we will extend
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the idea to disclosure more broadly.
Where consumers are purchasing items online, we propose a regime
whereby their Big Data profiles help determine which disclosures they see
and which disclosures they do not see. The advantages of such a regime are
apparent. When online disclosures occur presently, single males who live
alone are shown warnings about the effects that prescription medication
may have on pregnant women. Childless seniors living in age restricted
communities are warned about how household goods may have small parts
that can break off and be swallowed by toddlers. Devout, observant
Mormons are warned about the effects of mixing a particular
pharmaceutical with alcohol. The proliferation of warnings targeted
towards a small set of potential consumers lengthens disclosures greatly,
heightening the risk that a consumer will fail to see the one or two
warnings that are very pertinent to people just like him. Too much
disclosure can be as bad as too little disclosure, because both result in a
consumer retaining too little pertinent information. We submit that the
disclosure strategy can be rescued and rejuvenated by a personalization
strategy that makes the disclosures each consumer sees shorter and more
relevant.
As technology improves, we would anticipate this sort of
personalization of disclosures occurring even in brick and mortar
supermarkets, shopping centers, and hardware stores.174 Twentieth century
disclosure technology involved a printed label with finite space and
constraints on how much manufacturers can shrink font sizes to cram more
information into those spaces. Twenty-first century disclosure technology
ought to take advantage of the fact that most consumers now shop with
smart-phones that can scan bar codes.175 Personalized disclosure
applications would enable a consumer to scan a product at the point of sale
and to see only the disclosures and warnings likely to be relevant to him.
We believe the health and safety gains from such innovation could be very
substantial. Personalizing disclosures will ensure that individuals don’t
have their time wasted with irrelevant disclosures and don’t fail to notice a
key disclosure that is buried amidst a plethora of irrelevant disclosures.
As best we can tell, this proposal for personalized disclosure is novel.
Although we think our idea is intuitive, we are unaware of any academic
literature discussing the prospects of using Big Data to personalize
disclosures. The closest proposal in the literature is a recent article by Gil
Siegal, Richard Bonnie, and Paul Appelbaum discussing personalized
disclosure in medicine.176 Their version of “personalized disclosure” differs
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from ours, and we think it lacks some of the advantages of our approach.
Their first approach to personalized disclosure acts patients at the outset
whether they would like to receive: a) very detailed and precise disclosure
of side effects and medical risks, including information likely to be of
interest to only a small subset of patients; b) moderately detailed and
general disclosure of side effects and risks, where minor and insignificant
risks are not disclosed to the patient; and c) very basic disclosures are
made, such as the reasons for the treatment, and the likely period of time
the patient will have to miss work.177 They view the patient’s choice about
how much disclosure to receive as legally significant: “once a patient has
stated his preferences and the procedure has taken place, he may no longer
argue in court that the informed consent process was inadequate in that it
failed to provide him with the information he needed.”178
Siegal and his co-authors also identify a second form of personalized
disclosure, one they seem to prefer. Under that approach, disclosure would
occur via software that enabled the patient to click on hyperlinks to find out
more about particular risks, side effects, or tradeoffs.179 The software would
record a transcript of what the patient asked to see and didn’t ask to see,
and this transcript would be admissible evidence in any subsequent
litigation over informed consent.
We think Siegal’s proposal is a step in the right direction, but as Big
Data proliferates and the sorts of technologies underlying FICO adherence
scoring improves, we think there is a strong case to be made for preferring
our version of personalized disclosure. Answering many questions about
whether one wants to read a particular paragraph may increase the stress
levels of patients, particularly ones who know that by selecting the minimal
disclosure option or failing to click on a particular hyperlink they will be
waiving various legal rights. A regime that scrutinizes the choices that
guinea pigs very similar to the patient have made with the benefit of full
information may be a more sensible way to proceed.180
Indeed, guinea pigs might work differently in the personalized
disclosure context. We would envision guinea pigs being compensated to
read various disclosures and then being asked to evaluate (both
immediately and several weeks after the treatment at issue) how useful the
disclosed information proved to be. Non-guinea pig patients would then be
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matched up with the choices made by the guinea pigs with personalities
and attributes most similar to them. The key point is that different warnings
will be differentially helpful to different sorts of people. Personalized
disclosure thus locates the warnings that were useful to “people like you”
or “people like those in your household” and provides you with those
warnings, and only those warnings, unless you opt for more complete
disclosure. Parents whose children have peanut allergies will constantly see
peanut-related warnings about products they are considering – including
perhaps an “Are you sure?” message in the checkout line; parents whose
own children have no allergies but who may be bringing in snacks to be
shared by a kindergarten class will need to opt into receiving allergen
information when circumstances dictate such additional precautions. We
anticipate that these sorts of personalized disclosures will save consumers a
great deal of time. More importantly, however, they will prompt more
consumers to actually read health and safety disclosures carefully.
We anticipate such personalized disclosures are likely to take root in
the arena of consumer warnings, but they may spread to other domains as
well. For example, a smart-phone application that knows, based on Big
Data and guinea pigs, that your are likely to be concerned about particular
sorts of risks, can also learn that you are concerned by particular
contractual provisions. Most people may not care about the terms of clickwrap software agreements, but some users may be sensitive about
particular rights, responsibilities, and waivers. Through automation, an app
could do what a good lawyer already does – read the contract in question
and advise the client about provisions that may be problematic in light of
the client’s idiosyncrasies. Here again, consumers could benefit from the
close scrutiny that compensated guinea pigs would devote to reading all the
pertinent contractual provisions.
There may be a similar role for personalization to play in the context
of government disclosures. For example, it may make sense for the
government to target air quality warnings directly to asthmatics (and their
parents) instead of broadcasting such warnings through mass media outlets
unlikely to pay them much heed. A city government that knows our daily
commute patterns (because we have agreed to share them) can let us know
about accidents along the route while staying silent about accidents on
other highways in the metropolitan area. Under the status quo, consumers
and voters can always “pull” such information out of the public sphere, but
doing so entails search costs and finding the pertinent information can be
difficult. Personalized disclosure may often be the most efficient
mechanism for pushing the right information to the right people, assuming
the state can be trusted to put information about individual citizens to
appropriate uses.
Finally, we think there is an important role to play for personalized
disclosures in personalizing default rules. Some consumers will respond
better than others to the possibility that they are entering into a contract
whose terms are dependent on choices made by others. Consumers whose
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profiles suggest they are likely to be upset by this level of uncertainty
might receive additional disclosures about anticipated directions of those
changes and be given easy opportunities to reject such changes. Consumers
whose profiles indicate an interest in saving money wherever they can –
even if it means more onerous contractual terms – might receive regular
notices about terms that could be modified if the customer wishes to realize
a cost savings. Other consumers, who rarely elect to pay less in exchange
for fewer contractual rights would receive fewer notices of this kind. In
short there are many ways in which personalized disclosure could address
some of the complexity problems that arise with personalized contracts.
Personalized disclosures can help consumers determine what their existing
profiles indicate about the meaning of a contract they are contemplating
signing, and how their profiles are influencing the contractual terms. Where
similar guinea pigs were not unified over which terms were best, the
consumer may be presented with active choices among several default
terms or instructions as to how the default might be altered.
Whereas the objections to personalizing default rules are many, we
think that the objections to personalized disclosure are fewer in number and
less significant. As with default rules, an individual could always request
disclosure of a greater quantum of information than what personalization
suggests, and we would want these choices to be honored. Given that
possibility, it is hard to imagine individuals engaging in strategic behavior
to affect the disclosures that would be made to them, and a personalized
disclosure regime can easily accommodate changes in individuals’
personalities and preferences. Concerns about cross-subsidies do not arise
with respect to personalized disclosure, nor do uncertainty and
fragmentation worries. And constitutional objections to personalized
disclosure by the government seem unlikely – the state regularly makes
judgments about which messages should be conveyed to which audiences,
and it seems hard to believe that even race-based messaging, such as extra
warnings to African Americans about the dangers of sickle cell anemia, are
constitutionally problematic. The potential downsides of personalized
disclosure, then, seem confined to misgivings about stereotyping and
privacy. There may also be worries about whether courts are really willing
to countenance the possibility that someone might not receive a warning
about an extremely low-probability side effect of a drug based on their
personality profile, and then, due to some fluke, the low-probability side
effect should manifest itself.181 In such circumstances, courts should not
award compensation. Social insurance, rather than the tort system, is the
best mechanism for compensating victims, given the inability of would-be
defendants to fully capture the benefits of non-disclosure resulting from
personalization.
To summarize, we think that personalized disclosures may be the
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wave of the future too. They have the potential to minimize the information
overload problem faced by consumers and to prompt consumers to start
paying attention to pertinent disclosed information once again. And they
even have the potential to alter, for the better, the way that contracting is
done.
CONCLUSION
The idea of personalized default rules has been “in the air” for several
decades. Although the origins of our inquiry can be found in Ian Ayres’s
essay, published twenty years ago, no one has developed a comprehensive
account of personalized default rules. Cass Sunstein took the idea an
important step further, and pointed out some of the main benefits and
drawbacks of a personalized default rule regime, compared with
impersonal defaults and active choices. Our Article has finally developed a
comprehensive framework for understanding the theoretical and practical
issues arising in the implementation of personalized default rules.
Along the way, we have contributed several innovations. For example,
we have shown how providing a limited number of guinea pigs with
resources to make rational decisions, and using particular guinea pigs’
choices to generate the default rules that will be presented to the most
similar members of the general public makes personalization substantially
more attractive. We have explained how majoritarian and minoritariandefault rules might be made more effective through personalization. And
we have broken down the category of personalized default rules into crude
personalized defaults (which are more easily predictable by the parties,
applied with more certainty by adjudicators, less precise, and more
impervious to strategic behavior) and granular personalized defaults (which
have the opposite costs and benefits). Perhaps most interestingly, we have
shown that personalization may present an important way forward, not only
for default rules, but also for various disclosures to consumers and the
citizenry. As we demonstrate, the most powerful critiques that have been
launched against disclosure are largely products of disclosure’s impersonal
nature. The disclosure strategy can be resuscitated via personalization.
Why has it taken the literature so long to reach this juncture? We
believe the answer is that until recently technological constraints would
have rendered our approach wildly unrealistic. But the Big Data revolution
fundamentally changed the equation, at least in the United States. Now
more than ever, implementing a personalized default rule regime is
attainable, and personalized disclosures are within reach, given minor
improvements in the social science research and applicable technology. Big
Data has its own economic momentum, but we have endeavored to show
how the development might open up new possibilities for legal
intervention. To that end, we call on legislatures and courts to respond to
the challenge proposed in this Article, by considering personalized default
rules for consumer contracts, contracts between repeat-players, inheritance
law, medical malpractice, and landlord-tenant law.
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Legislatures should consider tailoring personalized default rules, at
least in those areas when it is quite obvious that the law’s goals could better
be achieved with personalized default rules, and where implementing them
is feasible and not too costly. Thus, in inheritance law, intestacy rules
should be personalized in accordance with existing data, provided a bit
more research is first done into whether the preferences and characteristics
of intestates differ from those of testators of the same gender. Courts
hearing medical malpractice suits should allow doctors to raise the
argument that they adopted a disclosure practice that is consistent with the
personal characteristics of their patients, as revealed by FICO adherence
scores and other data-driven patient profiling technologies. Courts should
also avoid using constitutional provisions developed before personalization
could be contemplated to suffocate personalized rules in the crib.
Regulators should fund pilot projects to facilitate personalized disclosure,
and legislators might create safe harbor provisions to encourage
manufacturers, retailers, and service providers to begin innovating with
personalized disclosures in the private sector.
We realize that personalizing default rules and disclosure is costly.
There is a tradeoff here, somewhat similar to the rules versus standards
tradeoff, between certainty and accuracy: more personally detailed default
rules could increase accuracy but at the same time create uncertainty for
courts applying default rules to disputes and private actors trying to
anticipate what courts might do. Because the tradeoffs are significant, we
advocate beginning with personalized default rules in the easiest cases,
followed by incremental advances if early results are promising.
Personalized default rules and personalized disclosure are just two
pieces, albeit important ones, of a more ambitious idea, which is
personalized law in general. One could imagine a legal system where
criminal law, constitutional law, tort law, and property law are personally
tailored to people’s preferences and characteristics. Indeed, aspects of these
bodies of law are already personalized to some degree. Consider insanity
defenses or the Sentencing Guidelines in criminal law, litigant-sensitivity
in First Amendment law,182 the debate over tort law’s eggshell skull
doctrine,183 and takings doctrine’s focus on a landowner’s “distinct,
investment-backed expectations.” We might anticipate far more granular
and data-driven personalization in each of these domains during the coming
years. Envisioning such a legal system is beyond our present project.
Nevertheless, we believe the case for trying personalized default rules and
personalized disclosure in various contexts is sufficiently compelling to
warrant near-term experimentation.
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